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JURISDICTION AND ITS IMPACT ON STATE POWERS
MORRIS D. FORKOSCH*
The federal government itself, a delegatee of powers, exercises these
latter in numerous economic fields through the medium of regulating
boards, commissions, and agencies. Whether or not it has delegated any
such power to a board, the type or types so conferred, their extent, and
the manner of their exercise, involves another and separate question. We
discuss both, but emphasize the second, of these questions, confining
ourselves to the area of labor-management relations and still further
delimiting the analysis in other ways, e.g., the Railway Labor Act covers
railroads and airlines, so that carrier-employee relations are removed
from the area of discussion.1 Specifically, we consider the constitutional,
statutory, and discretionary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board and the legal, economic, and political backgrounds of such juris-
dictions as factors in their development and current exercise, emphasizing
throughout the conflict with the states which results from the existence,
delegation, and exercise or non-exercise of powers under these concepts.
1.) THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR BOARD
The federal powers are not alone specific but also general, so that
while it may be said that, among other particular grants, Congress may
coin money and declare war, and the President may act as the Com-
mander in Chief and appoint ambassadors, they may also respectively
investigate and fix rates, and declare blockades and dismiss executive
employees. In the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, popularly
called the Wagner Act, Congress bottomed the general federal labor
relations policy upon its legislative powers under the commerce clause
and also upon its sovereign powers over and within the District of Colum-
bia and the territories of the United States; 2 the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, popularly called the Taft-Hartley Act, con-
tinues in this vein, insofar as its Title I amends the Wagner Act, but
in its other Tides we may see additional bases utilized. For example,
under section 208 a federal district court may issue a "national health
or safety" injunction which, even though coupled with the federal com-
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Author, A Treatise on Labor Law.
1 There are other built-in limitations and exclusions in the 1947 Taft-Hartley
re-adoption of the original 1935 Wagner Act, 61 STAT. 136, 29 U. S. C. §141
(1947) et seq., via the definitions and exclusions found in §152 and elsewhere. We
do not discuss these phases of the Labor Board's jurisdiction.
Throughout this paper we refer to the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts. The
amended former is found in full in Title I of the latter, and all citations below
§100 refer to the amended Wagner Act. Above §100 the reference is to the Taft-
Hartley Act.
2 Found in Art. 1, §8, cls. 3 and 17, and Art. IV, §3, cl. 2, respectively. The
Wagner Act, in §2(6), defined "commerce" so as to utilize its powers under all
three of the cited clauses, e.g., "within" the District or any Territory.
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merce power, may be termed an exercise of the federal police power;a
to the extent that the Labor Board, under section 209(b), conducts a
secret ballot of the employees of each employer involved in the dispute
on the question whether they wish to accept the employer's final offer
of settlement, the Board is acting as the amanuensis of Congress under
such a police-power delegation.4 Or, insofar as Congress controls the
jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, section 301(a) creates a breach
of contract cause of action and section 303(b) permits a federal district
court suit for damage by any person injured because of a union's conduct
which, independently termed an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(4) of the amended Wagner Act, is now separately6 made
unlawful in section 303(a) unless the Labor Board has certified
the union which may now justify; additionally, under section 305,
Congress exercised its proprietary powers to prevent or punish strikes
by its employees against itself, and in sections 302 and 304 utilized
its sovereign powers as a government to make certain acts criminal.7
It is, however, solely with the commerce power in the delegation
of congressional powers found in Title I that we are concerned, for the
commerce power provides the base upon which the Board functions in
its non-adjudicatory and adjudicatory capacities, i.e., in representation
matters, in promulgating rules and regulations, etc., it acts in a quasi-
executive or legislative manner, whereas in disposing of complaints it acts
quasi-judicially. Has the Congress jurisdiction over all trade and com-
merce within the nation, and what jurisdiction has it delegated to the
Board? Despite contentions to the contrary,8 it is now judicially established
3 For a discussion of these concepts see Cushman, The National Police Power
Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3 MINN. L. R v. 289, 381, 452
(1919).
4 In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, (1952) the
famous Steel Seizure Case, the President was held not to have independent and
inherent executive powers, in times of peace, to seize private properties because
of an impending strike, where Congress had provided other procedures, e.g., as
described in text.
5 This statutory suit is to be distinguished from the analogous common law
suit for not alone are jurisdictional requirements different but the essential ele-
ments making up a cause of action are not the same. See Shirley-Herman Co. v.
International Hod Carriers Union, 182 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir., 1950).
6 The independent status of the two proceedings is discussed by Mr. Justice
Douglas in International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau
Spruce Corp., 342 U. S. 237 (1952).
7 See also Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. V. W.E.R.B., 336 U. S. 301, 311,
(1949), referring to- the War Labor Board's ruling during World War II that
maintenance-of-membership clauses be included in collective bargaining agreements,
This authority came not from the Wagner Act but "stems directly from the war
powers of the United States Government." Quoted from Greenebaum Tanning
Co., 10 War. Lab. Rep. 527, 534. See also note 175, infra.
s See, e.g., the most impressive arguments yet formulated, in I CRoSSKca,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, chaps. II-IX
(1953).
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in theory that the national government may control interstate, and the
local governments may control intrastate, commerce, with the former
superseding and controlling the latter when, for example, any undue burden
or obstruction upon interstate commerce results. This federal power,
when exercised within its constitutional borders, was early termed a
"plenary" one by Marshall,9 and in the 1937 Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. case, upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner Act, Chief
Justice Hughes confirmed this approach in the field of labor relations
but cautioned that "the scope of this [commerce] power must be con-
sidered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect
and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would
effectually obliterate the distinction -between what is national and what
is local and create a completely centralized government. The question is
necessarily one of degree."'" Two years later, in the Fainblatt case,
Mr. Justice Stone correctly reaffirmed that the question of the degree
of affectation was not applicable where interstate commerce was factu-
ally involved, for "The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
is plenary and extends to all such commerce be it great or small," and he
then concluded that "we can perceive no basis for inferring any intention
of Congress to make the operation of the Act depend on any particular
volume of [interstate] commerce affected more than that to which courts
would apply the maxim de minimis."" There were, therefore, two
aspects of an apparent lack of congressional power which constitutionally
and judicially limited the delegated power which the Labor Board could
exercise, namely, intrastate activities which had only an indirect and
remote effect upon interstate commerce were not within the federal
power, and even where interstate commerce was involved, or where
the affectation doctrine did permit the exercise of the federal power, still
when there was such a small and trifling amount of such commerce
involved that the de minimis doctrine was to be applied, the federal juris-
diction was held not to attach."
9 Gibbons v. Ogden, 5 U. S. (9 Wheat I) 562 (1824).
10 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (1937). In the
earlier Sick Chicken Case, for example, the Chief Justice had also warned that a
distinction between direct and indirect effects upon interstate commerce had to be
recognized, for if the latter, then "such [intrastate] transactions remain within
the domain of the State power.... This principle has frequently been applied in
[antitrust] litigation growing out of labor disputes." A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546-547 (1935).
11 N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt,. 306 U.S. 601, 606, 607 (1939). Justices McReynolds
and Butler dissented, the former writing an opinion.
12 The maxim is de minimis non curat lex, that is, the law does not concern
itself about trifles, and its application to the original Wage and Hour Law is
found in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U. S. 680, 691-694 (1946), and
to the amended (see note 18, infra) law in Frank v. Wilson & Co., 172 F. 2d 712
(7th Cir., 1949), cert. den. 337 U.S. 918 (1949). See, however, Mabee v. White
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Both of these limitations are respectively applied and formulated
judicially so that it is the courts which, ultimately, determine when the
intrastate activity is too indirect or remote, or the interstate activity so
trifling and picayune, as to be beneath federal jurisdiction and concern.
These are necessarily fluid legal concepts which defy static application
and therefore do "not satisfy those who seek for mathematical or rigid
formulas."1 3 How have these two judicial brakes upon congressional power
been applied? The short answer is that they have been relegated to
limbo, and yet such brusque treatment is not justified by events. The path
along which the early indirect-remote and de minimis doctrines traveled,
overturning legislative efforts to combat the Great Depression and to
forestall any recurrence thereof, was itself shortly blocked by a new
and far-reaching application of an old concept, namely, a federal police
power under the commerce clause which might be utilized for purposes
of economic control. Illustrative of this turn in judicial approach is the
1936 denunciation of the first, and the subsequent 1939 acceptance of
the second, triple-A, as well as the great expansion in federal power which
was approved under this latter statute; a further example is found in
the language and approach in the 1941 approval of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The first triple-A sought to control agricultural production
by the application of acreage quotas, using the taxing power for this
purpose; denied judicial acquiescence in this method Congress turned
to the commerce clause and was now upheld, the court pointing out that
"The statute does not purport to control production. It sets no limit upon
the acreage . . . It purports to be solely a regulation of interstate com-
merce, which it reaches and affects at the throat where tobacco enters the
stream of commerce,-the marketing warehouse."' 4 In other words the
product was "in" commerce when the federal power attached, but three
years later a small-time farmer, producing 11.9 acres of wheat in excess
of his quota of 11.1 acres, all to be consumed upon his farm and not a
bushel physically entering the local or national market, was held sub-
ject to the act because he thereby withdrew his economic purchasing
power from the national market .nd thus, in possible conjunction with
thousands of others who might do the some thing, affected interstate
Plains Pub]. Co., Inc., 327 U. S. 178, 181 (1946), where the application of the
doctrine was not permitted.
This legal de minimis doctrine is not to be confused with the administrative
de minimis doctrine, discussed in subd. 3, for the legal doctrine ousts the Labor
Board of all jurisdiction over the subject matter whereas the administrative
doctrine begins with jurisdiction a legal fact and then proceeds, discretionarily,
to refuse to accept jurisdiction for a variety of reasons.
13 Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 303 U.S. 453, 467 (1938),
stating also that "It is plain that the provision cannot be applied by a mere
reference to percentages .... " See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-
124 (1942).
14 Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47 (1937). The first act was declared
unconstitutional in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
[Vol. 16
JURISDICTION AND ITS IMPACT
commerce. 5 Likewise in stamping its unanimous imprimatur upon the
Wage and Hour Law, which controlled certain economic aspects of
production, the court pointed out that it was the shipment of the
manufactured goods in interstate commerce which was prohibited
when produced under sub-standard conditions not the production itself,
and that this was "indubitably" within the commerce reach of the federal
government so that "It is no objection to the assertion of the power to
regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the same
incidents which attend the exercise of the police powers of the states."' 6
The statute, however, covered not alone employees "engaged in com-
merce" but also those engaged in "the production of goods for com-
merce," and this latter clause was upheld to the extent that it "includes
at least production of goods, which, at the time of production, the em-
ployer, according to the normal course of his business, intends or expects
to move in interstate commerce although, through the exigencies of the
business, all of the goods may not thereafter actually enter interstate
commerce."" 7 To this federal power over producers whose interstate
intent could thus be judicially measured was added a like control over
employees of factory and office buildings in which the lessees were
producing for or engaged in interstate commerce, where "the work of
the employees in these cases had such a close and immediate tie with the
process of production for commerce" that it was "an essential part of
it,"IS and the courts have held that the "Jurisdiction under the Labor
Act is broader than jurisdiction under the Fair Labor Standards Act."'"
In other words, the federal reach is today not measured 'by any indirect-
remote yardstick but by the question whether the activity, local or not,
"exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce .... ,,2o
15 Wickard v. Filburn, supra note 13, at pp. 127-128: "That appellee's own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to
remove him from the scope of federal regulation whet, as here, his contribution,
taken together with that of many others similarly situated is far from trivial,"
citing Fainblatt and Darby cases, supra note 11 and infra note 16, respectively.
In N.LR.B. v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council, 341 U.S. 675, 683-684 (1951),
the Labor Board was upheld in doing just this, where "The Board adopted its-
examiner's finding that any widespread application of the practices here charged
might well result in substantially decreasing the influx of materials into Colorado
from outside the State .... " See also note 21, infra, and the Mabee case, supra
note 12, at p. 181, adopting the same approach for the Wage & Hour Law.
16 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941).
17Ibid., at p. 118.
18 Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 525-526 (1942). In the 1949 amend-
ments to the F.L.S.A. the coverage of the statute was narrowed by including em-
ployees engaged in any "closely related" process or occupations "directly essential"
to the production of goods for interstate commerce.
19 N.L.R.B. v. Dixie Terminal Co., 210 F. 2d 538, 540 (6th Cir., 1954).
20 Wickard v. Filburn, supra note 13, at p. 125. See also Howell Chevrolet
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 346 U.S. 482, 484 (1953), "that Howell was 'an integral part' of
General Motors' national system of distributors" and therefore within the Labor
Board's jurisdiction.
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On the above principles, then, the de minimis doctrine is also obsolete,
for the maxim does not require the Board to refuse to take jurisdiction
where "the immediate situation is representative of many others through-
out the country, the total incidence of which if left unchecked may well
become far-reaching in its harm to commerce."
21
The jurisdiction of the Labor Board, therefore, cannot extend
beyond that possessed by Congress and, to the extent that earlier judicial
views have -been modified, it may be concluded that congressional power
over intrastate activities is well-nigh omnipotent. There is, of course,
judicial genuflection to the legal and political principles of a federal-
state dichotomy but, to the degree that economic predilections today moti-
vate the court, there is a studied acceptance of the legislative choice.22
Thus, in discussing the power of Congress in the economic field of wages
and hours, Frankfurter stated that "Our problem is, of course, one
of drawing lines. But it is not at all a problem in mensuration. There
are no fixed points. The real question is how the lines are to be drawn
-what are the relevant considerations in placing the line here rather
than there. To that end we have tried to state with candor the larger
considerations of national policy, legislative history, and administrative
practicalities that underlie the [judicial] variations" in deciding concrete
cases.2 Included in these larger24 considerations which underlie con-
21Polish National Alliance v. N.L.R.B. 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944), quoted
in the Denver Bldg. case, supra note 15, at p. 685, fn. 14. The coliceptual opposition
to this possible breach in our system of a dual form of economic control is
cogently expressed by Cardozo in his concurring views in the Schechter case, supra
note 10, at p. 554.
22 See, e.g., the language in the Wickard case, supra note 13, at p. 129, and
also the Darby case, supra note 16, at pp. 114-115. By analogy we may refer to
the Segregation Cases, decided in 1954, which, in Chief Justice Warren's opinion
for the unanimous bench (which reads like an essay in sociology), contains the
statement that "In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to
1868 when the [14thl Arhendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its
full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.
Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives
these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws." Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 492-493 (1954). Cf., however, Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), and the subsequent bills in Congress, e.g., see
N. Y. Times, July 29, 1955, on the vote in the house.
28 The Kirschbaum case, supra note 18, at p. 523. The Justice was speaking
of Congressional policy, not power, and the considerations influencing the exercise
of that power and the judicial interpretation thereof, so that what he said is more
pertinent to the statutory and discretionary aspects of jurisdiction, considered below,
than here; however, to the extent that we can utilize the language for the instant
purpose, it is adopted.
24 The development of the federal powers over commerce, from its negative
judicial use in the Gibbons case, supra note 9, to its first positive Congressional
use in the I.C.C. Act of 1887, has been traced and briefly discussed by this writer
in FORKOSCH TREATISE ON LABOR LAW §§204-206 (1953). This long-term develop-
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gressional power over commerce, interstate and intrastate, and which
filter down to Labor Board fixing of jurisdictional policy, are not
alone the facts of an economic depression and the concomitant necessity
of drastic experimentation via increased federal power,25 but also, e.g.,
the facts of a shooting war in the early 1940's, a national effort to
prevent a post-war collapse, the Korean emergency, the cold war vis-
a-vis Russia, and the future atomic era; opposed to the increase in
national control are such facts as the political veering toward a more
central course,2" the federal withdrawal from the market place,27 the
greater degree of economic control turned back to the states,28 the
Hoover Commission's report on business enterprises, 29 and the possible
future lessening in world tensions. If this overall approach be condemned
because of its accordion-like nature then a counter is found in the due
process dispute raging in the Supreme Court over the content of that
clause, or it may be asked whether the Justices are economic and political
virgins or legal cadavers, enshrined or entombed far from the madding
crowd's ignoble strife.
ment is not considered here, so that it is the expansion and contraction of the
federal power in these past two decades of which we speak.
25 See, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 T.S. 548, 586 (1937), up-
holding the Social Security Act's unemployment features, Cardozo writing that
"The fact quickly developed that the states were unable to give the requisite
relief. The problem had become national in area and dimensions. There was need
of help from the nation if the people were not to starve."
26This trend cuts across party lines and the 1952 split in the Democratic
Party need not be gone into except to mention that, on May 23, 1955, Senator
George of Georgia, upon the Senate floor, inveighed against a provision in a
highway bill which would have empowered the federal government to control
advertising rights along a 550 foot strip of land on either side of the proposed
highways. "Throughout this whole bill is a decided trend toward federalization
of whatever the Federal Government touches," said the Senator, and the Senate
unanimously removed the advertising provision. New York Times, May 24, 1955,
p. 21, col. 1.
27 E.g., the increased use of private concerns and suppliers for federal
requirements to the exclusion of federal agencies formerly so doing, as in the
Dixon-Yates contract with the A.E.C. for the building of a plant to supply elec-
trical energy. (Subsequently terminated)
28 E.g., the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 67 STAT. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §1301
et seq., returning to the coastal states the underwater oil lands off their shores,
within a three-mile limit, after the Supreme Court had upheld the federal govern-
ment's right thereto. See citations to original holdings and discussions of other
aspects in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954). See also the efforts, by legis-
lation, of the natural gas states to obtain control of such gas wells within their
states, despite Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), and Pan-
handle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
29 May, 1955, stating, at pp. 1 and 3, that the federal government's "com-
mercial-and industrial-type facilities within the Department of Defense . . .
probably exceeds 2,500," and that 'Probably about 1,000 industrial facilities could
be eliminated without injury to our national defense or any essential governmental
function." At p. 45 the Report began its analysis of government-owned business
enterprises of the civilian agencies, and stated that "Many of these publicly
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
2.) THE STATUTORY JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR BOARD AND THE
FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT
a.) Its delegated jurisdiction.
The possession by Congress of a broad scope of power under the
comimerce clause permits that body to do, or delegate to others to do,
much within this area. The commerce power, however, is a Cconcur-
rent" one, i.e., usually both federal and state jurisdictions may lay hold
of the trade and commerce involved, 31 subject to the former's supremacy
as herein discussed. Congress, however, has created not one agency and
vested it with all of such constitutional powers but, rather, has set up
numerous commissions and boards and thereby parceled out much of these
powers. For example, the Interstate Commerce Commission has juris-
diction, in the field of interstate commerce, over not alone railroad
rates but also trucks, water carriers, some pipelines, etc.; the Federal
Trade Commission deals with unfair trade practices, the prevention of
monopolies before they utilize their power, etc.; the Wage and Hour
and Public Contracts Divisions handle the wage and hour and other
provisions under the F.L.S.A. and Walsh-Healey Acts; the National
Mediation Board has jurisdiction of railroad and air carriers insofar as
the determination of bargaining representatives is concerned, analogous
to the powers of the Labor Relations Board in the general area of labor
relations; etc. It is therefore a question of what congressional powers
have been particularly delegated in a national field and, through judicial
exegesis, the delegatee's powers are additionally determined and even
circumscribed, i.e., it is not only Congress which limits the agency's
jurisdiction -by statute but also the judiciary, through its powers of inter-
pretation.3" While there may therefore be a narrow legislative grant
and a cautious legislative and judicial delimiting of powers and juris-
diction, yet, within this delegated field, the Labor Board is supreme.
Thus, in its First Annual Report, this agency stated that its "jurisdiction
is coextensive with congressional power to legislate under the commerce
owned enterprises compete with private business; and a few enjoy a monopoly
position since private enterprise in effect has been excluded from the field. There
exists no definitive list of these publicly owned enterprises."
30 See, e.g., Secs. 28-34, and 192-194, the author's forthcoming text in
Administrative Law, to be published, January 1956, by The Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Indianapolis.
31 See, e.g., Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. W.E.R.B., 336 U. S. 301, 315
(1949), for merely one illustration of judicial use of this concept, and also Grant,
The Nature and Scope of Concurrent Po'wer, 34 CoLuM. L. Rav. 995 (1934).
32 See also note 60, infra. Of course the judiciary may expand or permit
the agency tt expand the delegated jurisdiction so as to include persons or items
not desired to be granted, whereupon Congress may or may not accept, e.g., in
N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), newsboys were held
employees of papers but Congress, in the 1947 amendments, and in its committee
reports, indicated a contrary desire, whereupon the courts, N.L.R.B. v. Steinberg,
182 F. 2d 850 (5th Cir., 1950), and the Labor Board, In re Hearst Consolidated
Publications, 83 N.L.R.B. 41 (1949), followed suit.
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clause of the constitution,"33 and the Supreme Court, in upholding the
law, felt that the grant to the Board in section 10(a), to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice "affecting commerce,"
as the broad term was defined in section 2(6-7), stemmed from a plenary
power."4 The Board was therefore upheld in asserting jurisdiction where
less than .001% of an employer's sales were in interstate commerce,
35
and the act was held "applicable to a processor, who constitutes even a
relatively small percentage of his industry's capacity,"36 the court rea-
soning that many drops of water eventually make a river so that, as already
discussed, catching one such drop in a labor dispute, if repeated for other
drops, eventually make a river so that, as already discussed, catching one
such drop in a labor dispute, if repeated for other drops, eventually
would dry the stream.3" The jurisdiction of the Labor Board in the
entire field of labor relations is therefore not as broad in scope as the
over-all commerce power of Congress but, within the limited field of
the delegation actually made, the Board's jurisdiction and powers are
coextensive with and similar to the (commerce) powers Congress might
exercise directly if it legislated specifically."8
What powers have been actually delegated to the Labor Relations
Board by the Congress? The basic statute today is the amended Wagner
Act but, as we have seen, the Taft-Hartley Act itself, in Title II for
example, requires the Board to assume other duties under specified con-
ditions. We are concerned solely with the Board's current jurisdiction
and powers under the Wagner Act which, in effect, gives the agency
jurisdiction under the commerce clause over a segment of the nation's
economic life, and also grants nonjudicial (i.e., administrative) and
judicial powers to act within that jurisdiction. These terms, jurisdiction
and power, are not synonymous, e.g., a government may always have
jurisdiction and power but need not exercise the latter except when
33 Annual report (1936) p. 135. See also note 19, supra.
34 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). The
amended Act continues the terms and definitions verbatim.
35 N.L.R.B. v. Schmidt Baking Co., 122 F. 2d 162 (4th Cir., 1941).
36 N.L.R.B. v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n., 310 U.S. 318, 326 (1940) ; the amount
was roughly 1%, although in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940),
the Sherman Act was held inapplicable in a labor situation to a corporation, 80%
of whose product was shipped interstate, because this 80% constituted less than
3% of the total value of the industry's entire output, a strong dissenting minority
feeling that by analogy to the Wagner Act there was jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act. The majority's reasoning was based upon the congressional desire
to strike only at unreasonable restraints.
37 See notes 12, 15, and 21, supra, and also N.L.R.B. v. Suburban Lumber Co.,
121 F. 2d 829 (3rd Cir., 1941), cert. den. 314 U. S. 693 (1941).
38 See, e.g., the language in Amalgamated Ass'n. of Street, Electric Ry. &
Motor Coach Employees v. W.E.R.B., 340 U.S. 383, 391 (1951): "Congress . . .
saw fit to regulate labor relations to the full extent of its constitutional power
under the Commerce Clause . .. "
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required or desired, 9 so that an agency may have been granted a broad
or a narrow jurisdiction and, within that granted jurisdiction, its delegated
powers may likewise be broad or narrow.4" Put differently, the Board has
as its goal the effectuat.ion of the congressional desire to prevent ob-
structions to interstate commerce by upholding those general rights found
in section 7, namely, the right of employees to, or to refrain from, self-
organization and collective bargaining through their own representatives,
but its jurisdiction extends only to those persons not excluded or exempted
by the definitions in section 2, and does not touch the federal or state
governments or their agencies or subdivisions, etc.; within this area of its
granted jurisdiction the Board has been "empowered" (section 10 [a]) to
prevent unfair labor practices, and authorized to "decide" (section 9 [b] )
the appropriate unit, to "investigate" petitions for elections, to "direct"
elections, and to "certify" the results thereof. 41 To what extent are those
grants and delegations of jurisdiction and power to .be exercised solely and
exclusively by the federal Board and no others, federal or state, and to
what degree is it obligatory upon that Board to act within its jurisdiction
and powers? The first question is of present concern while the second
is later treated under the Board's discretionary exercise of its powers
(subd. 3).
b.) Its supremacy in a direct conflict and its ability to preempt.
In an area of dual sovereignty conflict is a necessary concomitant
and, even within a unitary form of government, questions of jurisdiction
among delegatees are ever present. The Labor Board's jurisdiction, within
the federal sphere of authority, has been carefully carved out so that,
on paper, no jurisdictional conflicts with other federal agencies need
arise; any error in draftsmanship can be congressionally corrected so
that no such possible internal federal difficulties over inter-agency juris-
diction ordinarily need continue. Here the national legislature has power
under the constitution and is distributing this power as it sees fit, subject
only to other constitutional limitations and requirements, e.g., acceptable
standards so as to prevent delegations from running riot. When the juris-
diction of a state or its agency, however, directly and irrevocably collides
with that of the Congress or its delegatee, then a judicial refereeing
under constitutional rules is necessitated, and it is this federal-state conflict
39 E.g., the approach is found in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934), where Hughes wrote that "While emergency does not
create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power."
40 While the Labor Board has a limited jurisdiction in the entire field
of employer-employee relations, within its delegated area of labor relations it has
received all of the powers of Congress, thus encompassing quasi legislative,
executive, and judicial powers.
41 §9(c) (1). Other powers of course, have been delegated, e.g., to issue
subpenas, §11(1), to apply for temporary injunctions, §10(j), or enforcement
orders, §10(e), but we are concerned primarily with the quoted ones.
42 The phrase is in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, supra note
10, at p. 553.
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which requires examination so that the federal Board's jurisdiction be
determined. We start, at the outset, with the supremacy clause found
in Art. VI of the Constitution which, applicable to any such outright
conflict, denounces local action. Past judicial inquiry has been primarily
concerned with the directness of the conflict, voiding state action when
it so impinges upon the federal effort that the latter is negated, impaired,
or even deflected,43 and also proscribing completely any state action, even
when the federal government itself has not acted, where the subject
matter is national in scope and requires uniform legislation. 44 There also
developed a preemption or interstices doctrine, the former being an active
and the latter a passive concept of federal action; the theory is that the
states may act in a concededly federal area which has not been taken
over by the federal government, and even when the latter does act, the
states may act or continue to act to the extent that Congress has not de-
clared a policy or has not legislated upon any portion of the subject
matter, i.e., the states may act upon interstate commerce within the
cracks left open by the federal policy or law.45 This last doctrine is a
judicial one, not a Labor Board policy, and is at the nub of present-day
difficulties between the federal Act on the one hand, and like state acts,
agencies, and courts on the other. The approach to this judicial doctrine be-
gins with the admitted constitutional power of Congress over interstate
commerce to its actual exercise in the statute creating the Labor Board and
endowing it with powers; the national legislature has jurisdiction and plen-
ary power in this field, but what did it intend by its statute? This intent is,
in situations such as these, the key to the problem, and the problem con-
cerns itself with Labor Board jurisdiction, not powers, as we have dis-
43 Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937), stating that the local act
"is superseded [by the federal] only where the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct
and positive' that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or consistently stand together."'
See also Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 539, 543 (1945), denouncing a state require-
ment that union business agents be licensed because an "irreconcilable conflict"
between the federal and state acts occurred, and quoting from Union Brokerage
Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 207 (1944), that the federal statute controls when
the two acts cannot "move freely within the orbit of their respective purposes
without infringing upon one another."
44 See, e.g., the language in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299, 319 (1851), and also Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), P.U.C. v. Attle-
boro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927), U.S. v. P.U.C. of Calif., 345 U.S. 295,
304 (1953). In this last case the court made reference to "those few unique federal
statutes" which, in such a field, nevertheless permitted states to act.
45 In Quaker Oats Co. v. City of New York, 295 N.Y. 527, 68 N.E. 2d 593,
595 (1946), the court of appeals said that "even if the Federal government has
legislated in a particular field, local regulation in that field is not necessarily
prohibited unless national uniformity is essential. The State or municipal statute
will be striken only if-in terms or in practical administration-it conflicts with
the Federal law or infringes on its policy." The federal government may preempt
completely or piece-meal, i.e., it may, by successive laws, narrow or blot out one
or more of the cracks it left.
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tinguished them above, as well as with the intent of the Congress that
such jurisdiction be or not be, in whole or in part, exclusive.
c.) The negath-4ng of state action under the federal statute does not auto-
matically result in Labor Board jurisdiction.
Exactly what is the jurisdiction of the Labor Board? This is a
positive concept, for the basic statute found in Title I of the Taft-Hartley
Act gives us this information, and the decisions of the judiciary inter-
pret the language where required. To the extent here required this granted
jurisdiction has already been given and, in the discussion which follows, is
elaborated upon. However, and for the development and understanding
of the federal-state conflict, there must 'be mentioned a negative concept
as well, i.e., the congressional policy and intent to have some degree of
labor-management uniformity in interstate commerce. This latter approach
prevents state action, although not necessarily requiring or permitting
federal action, and in effect does or may create a no-man's land in
interstate commerce, the federal Board may not have been granted juris-
diction, and the states being denied jurisdiction or power to act.4" This
negative concept may be illustrated 'by HRlt v. Florida,4 where the state
enjoined Hill, a business agent, and his union employer, from so func-
tioning until a state license had been obtained; in denouncing the act
which prevented defendants from operating within the state until the
conditions required for the issuance of a license had been fulfilled, the
Supreme Court majority referred no less than five times in .three para-
graphs to the "full freedom" of choosing their own bargaining repre-
sentative which the Wagner Act envisioned. This term is found in section
1, the policy section, which declares it to be federal policy to eliminate
obstructions to interstate commerce by, among other things, "protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing . . ." This,
said Mr. Justice Black, "means freedom to pass upon that agent's quali-
fications," and the Florida statute, by limiting a union's choice of its agent
or bargaining representative, "substitutes Florida's judgment for the
workers' judgment," thereby shrinking the full freedom "to a greatly
limited freedom" so that the local act "stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.")4
8
If this statute were to be upheld, continued the Justice, then
employers could defend a refusal-to-bargain complaint before the Board
on such ground, although where this had occurred the Board had "properly
rejected" the defense because "Congress did not intend to subject the
46 This no-man's land is not the same as the Board's accordion policy de-
veloped in subd. 3, infra, for there the Board has jurisdiction, which it refuses
to exercise, whereas here it has no jurisdiction even if it desired to act.47 Supra note 43.
4 8Ibid., at pp. 541 and 542, the last quotation being adopted from Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 -(1941).
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'full freedom' of employees to the eroding process of 'varied and perhaps
conflicting provisions of state enactments.' "" Chief Justice Stone agreed
that one portion (section 4) of the Florida act conflicted with the
Wagner Act, but felt that the latter's section 7, rather than its section
1, was the source of the conflict, section 7 granting employees "the right
... to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing;"
he disagreed, however, in the denunciation of another portion of the
state's law (section 6), because the innocuous requirements there were
"not incompatible with the National Labor Relations Act, since it in no
way hinders or interferes with the performance of the union's functions
under that Act.""0 Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented (Roberts concurr-
ing in the dissent) because the state had power to act as it did and
because "Congress has neither expressly nor by fair inference forbidden
Florida to deal with the matter with which Florida has dealt and Con-
gress has not." His lengthy opinion concluded with the view that con-
gressional legislative efforts were designed to wipe out the unfair labor
practices of employers in fighting their employees' efforts to organize, and
that "All other aspects of industrial relations were left untouched by
the Wagner Act, and purposely so .... When Congress purposely dealt
only with the employer aspect of industrial relations and purposely ab-
stained from making any rules touching union activities, the internal
affairs of unions, or the responsibility of union officials to union members
and to the public, Congress certainly did not sponge out the States'
police power as to these matters."'" It will be noticed that Black (and
the majority) pegged his approach on the opening policy section of the
Act, whereas Stone secured his to the provisions of the Act itself; the
latter therefore narrowed the base from which local statutes could be
denounced and thus felt that section 6 of the local statute did not con-
flict with the federal mandate, as distinguished from its policy. To
Frankfurter, there was no provision, no policy, and therefore no intent
that Congress desired to overthrow state efforts in these respects. All of
these Justices had previously agreed with Douglas, in the All en-Bradley
case, that a state "conflict with the policy or mandate of the federal
Act" was not shown where a state labor board held a union guilty of
unfair labor practices in mass picketing, threats, obstructions, picketing
the homes of employees, and like conduct, for no federal intention to oust
49 325 U. S. at p. 542, referring to and quoting from In re Eppinger & Russell
Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1259, 1260 (1944). There the Board's trial examiner had rejected
the employer's contention and on similar grounds, at p. 1266. See also N.L.R.B. v.
Hearst Publ., Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 122-123 (1944), holding that the definition of
"employees" in the Wagner Act was not to follow the common law whims of the
various states, thereby resulting in a "patchwork plan for securing" workers'
rights under the federal statute, for "The Wagner Act is federal legislation,
administered by a national agency, intended to solve a national problem on a
national scale."
GO325 U.S. at p. 546 (1945).
51 Ibd., at pp. 547 and 559 respectively.
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states of their police power in such a situation was disclosed by the federal
act.5 2 However, whereas Douglas had previously used both terms, i.e.,
policy and mandate, to show no opposition (although the disjunctive "or"
was inserted), Black and Stone now disagreed as to the use of policy
alone as the basis for denunciation (with Douglas siding with Black),
with Frankfurter using both policy and mandate to show no opposition.5 3
This negativing of all state action, whether by labor boards, courts,
or administrative licensors, and even when allegedly based upon rea-
sons other than labor relations, is thus not dependent upon identical federal
action; so long as such a federal policy or intent to protect certain con-
duct is apparent, states cannot control this area of activity.54 This does
not mean that ipso facto the Labor Board is authorized to assume control,
for its own jurisdiction is separately to be analyzed and discussed. In both
the Hill and 1llen-Bradley cases the federal Board was definitely held
not to have the interstate jurisdiction or power which the states had
utilized, so that from the Hill case there resulted an area of union and
individual interstate conduct which could not be regulated by the states
and had not been regulated by the nation.
This particular no-man's land, however, was not long vacant for,
two years after Hill v. Florida 5 was decided, the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments somewhat entered the overall field and required unions to file
financial and organizational reports, publicize the former among their
members, have officers file non-Communist affidavits, etc. 56 A mandate
52 Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, etc. v. W.E.R.B., 315 U.S. 740, 750 (1942).
This was an unanimous decision, the opinion also stating: "But, as we have said,
the Federal Act does not govern employee or union activity of the type here
enjoined. And we fail to see how the inability to utilize mass picketing, threats,
violence, and the other devices which were here employed impairs, dilutes,
qualifies or in any respect subtracts from any of the rights guaranteed and pro-
tected by the federal Act. Nor is the freedom to engage in such conduct shown to be
so essential or intimately related to a realization of the guarantees of the federal
Act that its denial is an impairment of the federal policy. If the order of the
state Board affected the status of the employees or if it caused a fortfeiture of
collective bargaining rights a distinctively different question would arise ...
Since the state system of regulation, as construed and applied here, can be re-
conciled with the federal Act and since the two as focused in this case can
consistently stand together," the state action was to be upheld. Ibid., at pp. 750-751.
53 See also note 90, infra, for a comment on this disagreement. To this writer
no either-or disjunctive appears; both mandate and policy are to be utilized, ex-
cept that mandate is superior as a source for the ascertainhnent of intent.
54 See e.g., Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 487 (1955):
"Certainly if the conduct is eventually found by the National Labor Relations
Board to be protected by the Taft-Hartley Act, the State cannot be heard to say
that it is enjoining that conduct for reasons other than those having to do with
labor relations."
55325 U.S. 538 (1945).
56 These requests are found in §§9 (f-h) of the amended Act. For discussions,
see FORKoscH, TREATISE ON LABOR LAw, §§125-137 (1953), and also Internal Affairs
of Unions: Government Control or Self-Regulation?, 18 U. Cui. L. REv. 729 (1951).
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was thus added to the policy, although the mandate was of a negative
nature, i.e., the compulsion upon unions was enforced by denying access
to the Board processes. There was and is, nevertheless, affirmative federal
legislation in this area, and so the question arises whether all state action
in the field of interstate commerce, involving similar or analogous re-
quired union conduct, is proscribed. Since Congressional intent is of im-
portance the answer must be sought outside the statute for the law
contains no superficial clue as to the specific federal desire for preemption.
Since there is no particular and specific aid found elsewhere, we conclude
that the federal law does not forbid all local action in this area, and this
conclusion involves a process of rationalization based upon: the unanimous
judicial approach in the Allen-Bradley case, that a state's police power is
still effective in particular aspects of an area, not covered by federal law,
even though the latter has acted upon other aspects within that same area;
a prior judicial upholding of a state law which required interstate ticket
brokers or agents who arranged for interstate motor travel of passengers
to be licensed and bonded;" r the identical approach of Stone and Frank-
furter in the Hill case, i.e., a state may exercise its police powers to punish
and control local fraud, violence, etc. even though interstate commerce
was involved, where Congress has not specifically umbrella-ed or blanketed
the conduct and no constitutional limitation is involved or undue burden
on national commerce results; and the later decisions of the Supreme
Court, treated below. Thus, even though states may not regulate unions
See also the Board's rulings in Plaster Tenders, Construction, General & Ship-
yard Laborers' Local Union No. 802, 111 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (1955), and National
Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards, 111 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (1955), holding that
a union which had failed to distribute copies of its financial reports to its mem-
bers was not in compliance and could not avail itself of the Board's processes;
this Board inquiry into compliance status is to be contrasted with the inability
of the Board to inquire into the truth or falsity of the non-Communist affidavits,
Farmer v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, 211 F. 2d 36
(App. D. C. 1953), cert. den. 347 U.S. 943 (1954), International Fur & Leather
Workers Union v. Farmer, 117 F. Supp. 35 (D.C.D.C. 1953), although In re
Maurice E. Travis, Sec'y.-Treas., Int'l. Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers,
Ill N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1955), the official publicly announced his affidavit was
false whereupon the Board found the union and its affiliates to be out of com-
pliance.
5 California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941). There Congress had not
sought to regulate such agents but had excluded these irregular motor vehicle
carriers from the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. The Supreme Court felt that no undue
burden on interstate commerce resulted, no constitutional limitation upon state
action was present, and that local concern over the fraudulent practices of such
ticket agents was sufficient, under the police power, to support the $1 license fee
and the filing of a $1,000 bond, failing to obtain these resulting in a misdemeanor
conviction. Said the court: "The present case is not one of prohibiting interstate
commerce or licensing it on conditions which restrict or obstruct it. . . . For here
the regulation is applied to one who is not himself engaged in the transportation
but who acts only as broker or intermediary in negotiating a transportation con-
tract between the passengers and the carrier." At pp. 114-115.
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or business agents, where questions of the character and fitness of the
agents are at issue, so as to impair the rights of employees to organize
and bargain freely, evils which arise from the conduct and actions of these
representatives may, under a state's police powers, still be regulated and
punished.5"
d.) The positive jurisdiction of the Labor Board: negating state action.
The positive jurisdiction of the Labor Board is also a source of the
federal-state antinomy we have just examined, although now the scope
of the conflict is narrowed. For example, in analyzing the negative con-
cept of Congressional policy and intent we saw that, in Hill v. Florida,
Black and Stone had disagreed on the use of policy as a basis for de-
nouncing state action, the latter preferring the mandated specifics to the
preamble's generalities. It is still Congressional intent, however, which is
the touchstone of the conflict, as a federal plenary power is involved
which, as we have seen, can sweep clean the Interstate area of all regula-
tion, federal or state, or permit only federal or only state, or any com-
bination desired. For example, the Congressional intent may be to reject
any state regulation, even though it does not itself regulate,5 9 or it may
desire solely federal regulation, even though only partial in scope,6 0 thereby
preventing any state action, 61 or it may permit state regulation even
though it does not itself regulate,6 2 or it may itself regulate, to an extent,
58 E.g., in Taft-Hartley §302(c) (5) we find the federal requirements con-
cerning trust funds for pensions, etc., in some detail, and under subd. (d) a viola-
tion is made a misdemeanor punishable by a $10,000 fine or prison term for one
year or both. Does this affirmative federal regulation oust the states of all power
to affect or touch this identical conduct? Put differently, does the federal legis-
lation render ineffective state criminal laws, etc.? The answer is no, and if it
were otherwise then most of the local investigations into the abuses of pension
trust funds by their trustees would go for naught, and legislation on the books
would be a hollow mockery.
59 In the Cooley case, supra note 44, and infra note 62, the dissenting Jus-
tices predicated their disagreement upon the lack of any state power to regulate
interstate commerce, although agreeing that Congress might adopt such a state
law and thereby legitimatize it; the concurring Justice felt "that this is an original
and inherent power in the States . . . ." 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
60 See the analysis and discussion, with numerous citations, in Kirschbaum
v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 520-21 (1942), stating, inter alia, "Thus, while a
phase of industrial enterprise may be subject to control under the National Labor
Relations Act, a different phase of the same enterprise may not come within the
'commerce' protected by the Sherman Law."
61 See, e.g., Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926),
Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 57, 60-61 (19341): "So far as the
safety equipment of such vehicles is concerned, these [federal] acts operate to
exclude state regulation whether consistent, complimentary, additional or other-
wise." See also the Bethlehhem Steel case, infra note 65, at p. 773.
62 In the Cooley case, supra note 44, at p. 320, the national legislature had
specifically said, in a 1789 statute, that pilots "shall continue to be regulated in
conformity with the existing laws of the states . . . until further legislative pro-
vision shall be made by Congress." In upholding a Pennsylvania statute the
majority held "that the mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate con-
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and simultaneously permit state regulation to some additional extent or to
the balance not federally regulated.' In the narrow field of interstate
labor-management relations Congress has set forth, in the amended-
Wagner Act, a series of positive jurisdictional bases upon which the
Labor Board is to act and to effectuate the legislative desires; has Con-
gress thereby intended that all state regulation be prevented, or that some
be permitted and some prevented, or that all state regulation be permitted
except when it conflicts with this federal legislation (or the policy ex-
pressed in it)? 64 The judicial approach in this mandated area is the same
as in the overall policy area, namely, to strike down state action only
when the federal statute (or its policy) requires it. In other words, states
are not bereft of all power to act but may act until and except where
the federal intent is to the contrary. The outstanding pre-Taft-Hartley
judicial expression of this view is the Bethlehem Steel representation (not
unfair labor practice) case, 5 decided one month after the Supreme
Court had upheld a Board determination that foremen were protected
by the federal statute,66 and in which, despite the existence of agreements
between the two Boards concerning a division of jurisdiction, the Court
denounced the local Board's recognition of foremen at a time when the
national Board had refused to approve foremen's units. The facts disclosed
a vacillating Labor Board policy as to this group of men, first recognizing,
then "for policy reasons but without renouncing jurisdiction," rejecting,
and finally again recognizing them as entitled to organize and bargain
merce, did not deprive the states of power to regulate pilots, and that although
Congress has legislated on this subject, its legislation manifests an intention, with
a single exception, not to regulate this subject, but to leave its regulation to the
several states."
63 See also Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co.,
237 U.S. 597, 60+ (1915) : "It is suggested that the act is in aid of interstate com-
merce. The state law was not contrived in aid of the policy of Congress, but to
enforce a state policy differently conceived . . . . When Congress has taken the
particular subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a
state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Con-
gress has seen fit to go .... The legislation is not saved by calling it an exercise
of the police power . .. ."
64 The policy in §1 of the Act, previously examined, is general policy per-
meating the entire statute and forming a broad base upon which it rests; the
particular policy here involved is narrowed to the concept(s) underlying the
actual section(s) discussed and seeks to effectuate this, and not another, portion
of the law.
65 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N. Y. State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S.
767 (1947). A former Chairman, Keith Lorenz, felt that all federal-state difficulties
stemmed from this case, Conflict of Jurisdiction Between National and New York
State Labor Relations Boards, 5 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 411, 412-13 (1952).
66 Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 485 (1947), a bare majority
holding foremen were within the definition of "employee" in §2(3) of the Wagner
Act. The law has been changed by the Taft-Hartley amendments and this is
shortly discussed.
1955]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
under the statute's protection;"' during the second, i.e., non-recognition,
period the state Board took jurisdiction and the employers appealed; the
Supreme Court now decided that both laws could not stand together and
that the local must yield to the national. Wrote Mr. Justice Jackson
for the majority of six:
Comparison of the State and Federal statutes will show
that both governments have laid hold of the same relationship
for regulation, and it involves the same employers and the same
employees. Each has delegated to an administrative authority a
wide discretion in applying this plan of regulation to specific
cases, and they are governed by somewhat different standards.
Thus, if both laws are upheld, two administrative bodies are as-
serting a discretionary control over the same subject matter ....
They might come out with the same determination, or they
might come out with conflicting ones as they have in the past.
... If the two boards attempt to exercise a concurrent jurisdic-
tion to decide the appropriate unit of representation, action
by one necessarily denies the discretion of the other. The second
to act either must follow the first, which would make its action
useless and vain, or depart from it, which would produce a
mischievous conflict.... The federal board has jurisdiction of
the industry in which these particular employers are engaged
and has asserted control of their labor relations in general ...
We do not believe this leaves room for the operation of the
state authority asserted.6"
67 The Bethlehem opinion merely noted (at p. 770) this shifting policy, citing
Board decisions, withouiving reasons. In the H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1947) to accompany H. R. 3020, at pp. 13-14, these changing views were
commented upon, the Report noting that the Board's original views supporting
recognition having resulted in the introduction "in Congress [of] a bill taking
foremen out of the Labor Act (H.R. 2239, 78th Cong.). While the bill was pend-
ing in the Military Affairs Committee of the House, the Board, on May 10, 1943
... reversed itself . . .The Military Affairs Committee then dropped H.R. 2239
... Then ... the Board changed its mind again," in the Packard case, and "As
a result . . . both Houses of Congress, by overwhelming majorities, passed the
so-called Case bill, exempting supervisors from the operation of the Labor Act.
The President vetoed the bill, and the Board continued to unionize foremen at an
accelerated pace."
From the above it would appear that the Board's 1943 reversal was actuated
solely by the legislative club wielded by Congress. However, one additional factor
should be set forth, namely, that the original views of the Board had been by a
2 to 1 vote (Millis and Leiserson versus Reilly), and the 1943 reversal had been
preceded by a change in Board composition, the new Member (Houston replacing
Leiserson) first voting with the original dissenter, thereby producing the 1943
reversal, and two years later changing his views and voting with the original
supporter (Millis) of supervisor protection. Of course we may now venture
into the reasons why Houston acted in this fashion, but conjecture ventures far
enough to this point.
68 330 U. S. at pp. 775-76. See also the discussion of rate making in
Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 442 (1912): "If the [federal] regulation
be not exclusive, this situation is presented: If the carrier obey the state law,
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In the Bethlehem Steel case the original Wagner Act did not ex-
pressly cover supervisors so that a question of legislative intent and also
judicial interpretation might have permitted temporary state action; but,
once the judiciary upheld the Board's jurisdiction, and the agency did
exercise its powers so as to support, denounce, or rule that no regulation
of supervisors was to occur, any and all state action not alone was to
be circumscribed and emasculated but had to cease.69 The national legis-
lature could, of course, correct this misinterpretation and misapplication
of its intent and, in the 1947 amendments, did so, by excluding from the
definition of "employee" any supervisor (section 2[3]), and now de-
fining this term (section 2[11]);7o additionally, in new section 14(a),
while permitting supervisors to become or remain members of a union,
Congress expressly said that employers "subject to" the federal Act were
not to be compelled to deem them "as employees for the purpose of any
law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining," so that
employers are "free in the future to discharge supervisors for joining a
he incurs the penalties of the federal law; if he obey the federal law, he incurs
the penalties of the state law. Manifestly one authority must be paramount, and
when it appears the others must be silent. We can see no middle ground." See also
the same concept expressed in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local
Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 499 (1953).
69At pp. 774-5 of 330 U.S. the majority pointed out that a state's police
powers might be upheld during an hiatus in federal action but "the conclusion
must be otherwise where failure of the federal officials affirmatively to exercise
their full authority takes on the character of a ruling that no such regulation is
appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of statute. . . . It is clear that
the failure of the National Labor Relations Board to entertain foremen's petitions
was of the latter class." The trouble was that it was not at all clear that such
Board failure to exercise its authority was a "ruling," especially in view of
the negotiations between the two boards, for the federal representatives were
hestitant about an unequivocal assertion of federal supremacy and a denunciation
of state action. See 330 U.S. at pp. 7934. The legal principle, however, is
clear, albeit the administrative effectuation was inept. Unquestionably the judiciary
here indulged in a bit of post hoc, ergo propter hoc reasoning, but this is here
immaterial.
70 "Supervisor" is a generic term, legally, and includes not alone foremen
blit others who fit the statutory definition. The Labor Board, subject to judicial
review, may therefore initially determine whether the facts in each case fit the
congressionally desired exclusion. See, e.g., discussions and citations in N.L.RB. v.
Leland-Gifford Co., 200 F. 2d 620 (1st Cir., 1952); Ohio Power Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
176 F. 2d 385 (6th Cir., 1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 899 (1949). (In the latter
case the Board's interpretation and application to the facts were rejected, and
numerous Board cases, not here discussed, have taken up variations and questions
of degree.) But even where an admitted supervisor is discharged the Board may
still find it an unfair labor practice when "it constituted an invasion of the self-
organizational rights of rank-and-file employees," i.e., following upon the heels of
the union's victory in the election, it "plainly demonstrated to rank-and-file em-
ployees that this action was part of its [the employer's] plan to thwart their self-
organizational activities" and thereby created a fear among these employees of
like treatment for continued support of the union. Talladega Cotton Factory, 106
N.LR.B. 295, 297 (1953).
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union, and to interfere with their union activities.""' The jurisdiction of
the Labor Board is thus not alone limited but, in express terms, the
possibility of state action is removed; there can thus be no federal-state
conflict over this particular employer-employee relation in the narrow
area of collective bargaining where the employer is subject to the federal
power over inter-state commerce, and various corollaries flow and ques-
tions arise (not here examined). For example, do the other definition-
exemptions in the federal Act ipso facto reject state jurisdiction or, since
supervisors are the only such exclusion so expressly treated in new sec-
tion 14(a), has Congress thereby expressed an intent that the states may
take hold of the other exclusions, e.g., agricultural laborers, domestics,
independent contractors?7 2 Or is it federal policy, as distinguished from
mandate, to prevent state jurisdiction of these subjects? Is the Supreme
Court's interpretation of such policy and mandate to continue as here-
tofore, with specific treatment via statutory language and policy ex-
pressions to be merely one or more factors, among others, which are to
be taken into judicial considerations? Has this Congressional reversal
determined that hereafter no state may act within the ambit of the Taft-
Hartley Act?
Before examining this question it is advisable to differentiate between
Cexclusive" and "primary" jurisdiction. The former implies that no other
power can act upon the subject or within the particular field involved,
so that if the Labor Board has such jurisdiction then, even if it desired,
no state agency or court would -be able to act. Congressional intent, as
we have seen, determines this (and it may also determine that no power,
federal or state, be able to act). Primary jurisdiction, however, does not
automatically oust others from any and all power to act but implies, in-
stead, that the Labor Board is the first agency to make any initial de-
termination; or, at least, that it should have the power to do so. If the
Board may exercise discretion as to whether to exercise this power, then
71 N.L.R.B. v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F. 2d 571, 579 (6th Cir.,
1948), cert. den. 335 U.S. 908 (1948), upholding the constitutionality of these
various provisions against equal protection and due process charges.
72The federal exemptions are more inclusive than these illustrations, en-
compassing government (federal and state) and governmental agencies, with
various state acts following suit by law or interpretation, and even broadening
the exemptions, employees subject to the Railway Labor Act, with the states,
generally doing likewise, etc. For illustration of judicial discussions and inter-
pretations involving hospital, education, and charitable .institutions, see St.
Luke's Hospital v. Labor Relations Commission, 320 Mass. 467, 70 N.E. 2d 10
(1946); Columbia University v. Herzog, 295 N.Y. 605, 64 N.E. 2d 351 (1945);
In re Salvation Army, 349 Pa. 105, 36 A. 2d 479 (1949).
A somewhat parallel analysis to that concerning supervisors may be drawn
in the case of independent contractors. In N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publ., Inc., 322
U.S. 111 (1944), newsboys were held to be employees but the House, in its Report,
supra note 67, at p. 18, disclosed the 1947 amendments were designed to correct
this decision, and the Labor Board accordingly so held in Hearst Consolidated
Publ., 83 N.L.R.B. 41 (1949).
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another question of Congressional intent enters: Did Congress intend
that if the Board rejected such an opportunity to act, that the states be
next in line? This last question is examined in subd. 3, below, whereas
we now examine the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board; in later sub-
sections g and h we examine the primary jurisdiction of the Board.
To stay within the supervisory field just discussed, the Labor Board
has remarked that while "the Act no longer protects supervisors discharged
for union activities, .... the amendments did not change the law hereto-
fore applied in cases . . . where the discharge of supervisory employees
constituted an invasion of the self-organizational rights of rank-and-file
employees." 7 More important, for us, is the question whether the new
law prevents states from compelling employers to deem supervisors "as
employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating
to collective bargaining." The Safeway Stores case, decided by the Cali-
fornia courts by 1953, is of interest.74 There a grocery chain, concededly
within the federal Board's jurisdiction, bargained with a rank-and-file
union of its clerks, to which a minority of its store managers belonged.
Safeway refused to grant a demand for a union shop of its managers and
was struck and picketed by the union, the minority of managers walking
out. The nisi prius court granted a temporary injunction against all
picketing and the intermediate court now agreed that the supervisors were
not entitled to any federal or state protection; -but, continued the majority,
they "were thereby thrown back into the jungle of tooth-and-claw labor"
relations and it was clear "that the Congress by this enactment [section
14(a) ] did not place any restriction on the common law or non-statutory
rights of supervisory employees to organize for the purpose of bargaining
with their employers and to use any of the recognizedly legal methods of
pressure (striking, picketing, etc.) which the common or non-statutory law
accorded them as employees." The court attached no importance to the
fact that a minority sought a union-shop agreement for it was only under
the statutory requirements that majority status was required for such a
requirement, and no state public policy was opposed to this minority de-
mand."' The injunction against violence was upheld but, insofar as it
struck at the picketing to compel bargaining on the desired contract,
73 Talladega Cotton Factory, supra note 70.
74 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' International Ass'n., 234 P. 2d
678 (1951), is the first appeal, from the superior court's granting of an injunction,
with a majority of the present court of appeal upholding the injunction as to viol-
ence and denying it as to picketing; a further appeal followed to the supreme
court 41 Cal. 2d 567, 261 P. 2d 721 (1953), in which a majority modified the
court of appeal and upheld the superior court (in effect reversing the inter-
mediate court) and granted the injunction in its entirety.
7 GIf this were not the law and only a majority could make such a demand
then the strike would be for an illegal purpose or object and hence enjoinable.
See FORKoSCH, TREATISE ON LABOR LAW §174, fn. 86, pp. 454-6 (1953), illustrat-
ing various aspects of the illegal purpose doctrine.
1955]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
modified.7" The supreme court of the state now reversed this modification
and reinstated the injunction in its entirety, 'but its reasoning went even
further than that of the lower court insofar as our present analysis is
concerned. The immaterial (for us) basis for its determination was that
the state's public policy was opposed to any division of loyalty by the
managers, i.e., to the employer and to the union, and "that the coercion
sought to be exercised by the defendants under the circumstances of this
case was not reasonably related to any legitimate interest of organized
labor; that the activities of the defendants were not in furtherance of any
proper labor objective, and that as a matter of sound public policy were
enjoinable ... ."" To arrive at this conclusion, however, the question of
federal preemption and proscription of state action had to be answered,
and with but a casual reference to the 1942 Allen-Bradley case, the
court now held that by Congress' exclusion of supervisory employees,
"the field as to them was left open to state control.""8
This cavalier treatment of federal intention does not ring true,
regardless of the result in this particular case, for public policy is a shifting
concept which, when judicially determined, may be judicially altered;
federal policy and intent may therefore be forced, willy-nilly, to shift
course not alone as the geographical limits of a state dictate, but also
within a state itself as the whimsies of its judges dictate. The reasons for
these conclusions return us to the Bethlehem Steel case. There the
Supreme Court reasserted the settled rule that state exclusion may be
implied from the nature of the legislation and the subject matter, even
though expressly not so declared; the Court felt that such exclusion could
be there inferred although Congress had not seen fit to set forth even
a general guide to the construction of the statute, as it had done in other
fields, e.g., the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the United States Warehouse Act;7" but since this Bethlehem
78 Quotations at 234 P. 2d pp. 681 and 687 respectively. The dissenting view
was that while supervisors could join a rank-and-file union an interstate employer
was not statutorily required to treat with them and a strike to compel this was
for an illegal purpose and therefore enjoinable.
77261 P. Zd 726 (1953). The minority dissented on this view of public
policy and therefore desired to overthrow the entire injunction. They apparentli
were in agreement with the majority on the question of state ability to act despite
the federal statutory policy and mandate in §14(a).
78 261 P. 2d at p. 724, referring to the len-Bradley case, supra note 52,
and also citing Gerry of California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 119, 194 P. 2d
689 (1948).
79 Supra note 65, at pp. 771-2, the first Act stating that "Nothing in this
subchapter shall effect the jurisdiction of the securities commission ... of any
State or Territory ... or the District of Columbia, over any security or any
person." 48 STAT. 84 (1933) 15 U.S.C. §77r. The second act, in 48 STAT. 903 (1934)
15 U.S.C. §78bb(a), repeated this language concerning only the State and then
added, "insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the
rules and regulations thereunder." Although the first statute does not have these
words of limitation upon state action, such is the construction placed upon it.
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decision the federal legislature has given us several guides, not alone in
the various sections of the Act heretofore cited and quoted, as well as
the Congressional intent as found in committee reports, but also in the
new proviso to section 10(a) of the amended Act, which permits federal
cession of jurisdiction where the state act and interpretation are in har-
mony with the federal law and interpretation. The original section, before
the 1947 amendments struck the language from the statute, made the
power of the federal Board to prevent unfair labor practices "exclusive"
and not to "be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise."
While Bethlehem's co-appellant, in its brief on appeal, urged that the
Board's exclusive power to determine the bargaining unit and to certify
the representative "is further demonstrated by the provisions" just quoted,
the majority and dissenting opinions did not allude to this language as a
criterion but, in this writer's -view, the present amended language is now
definitely expressive of a federal intent which must be honored. That
intent does not draw a fine distinction"° between a representation pro-
ceeding (the Bethlehem case) and an unfair labor practice matter (under
section 10 [a]), for if Bethlehem had refused to bargain with a federally
certified unit foremen it might have been proceeded against for a violation
of present section 8(a) (5), at which time the jurisdictional issue would
have had to be judicially resolved. 81 New section 10(a) may no longer
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E. 2d 263 (1949), affd.
on questions of due process concerning acquisition of jurisdiction, 339 U.S. 64-3.
The third act, 46 STAr. 1465 (1931) 7 U.S.C. §269, authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture "to cooperate with State officials . . . but the power, jurisdiction, and
authority conferred upon [him] . .. shall be exclusive with respect to all per-
sons securing a license hereunder so long as said license remains in effect."
Under this last statute federal control displaces hostile state control, In re
Farmers Cooperative Ass'n., 69 S.D. 191, 8 N.W. 2d 557 (1943), although the
act evinces an intention to cooperate with state officials, Merchants Exchange
of St. Louis v. Missouri ex. rel. Barker, 248 U.S. 365 (1919) ; while the licensee
cannot be required by a state to do more than the federal act or regulations
require, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), the federal statute
does not prevent all state regulations even though involving and affecting inter-
state commerce. Indepedent Gin & Warehouse Co. v. Dunwoody, 40 F. 2d 1, (5th
Cir., 1930); Edward R. Bacon Grain Co. v. Chicago, 325 Il1. App. 245, 59 N.E.
2d 689 (1945).
80 In subds. g, h, and i we draw many such fine distinctions, so that it may
be argued that we cannot play fast and loose with our methods but must be
consistent here and there. Since our concern is with the federal intent, our methods
cannot become the end, so that we may refuse to draw distinctions here and insist
upon them later.
8 This was the factual situation in N.L.R.B. v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co.,
169 F. 2d 571, 574 (6th Cir., 1948), although there the employer was found by
the Board to have discouraged membership in the foremen's association, etc.
In reliance upon the Packard Motor Car case, supra note 66, the Sixth Circuit had
earlier held, in the instant case, that foremen were statutorily protected but the
Taft-Hartley Act became law twenty days thereafter; the employer sought
certiorari and the Supreme Court remanded "for consideration of the effect"
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
make the Board's power "exclusive," but Congress has still retained
jurisdiction because its proviso empowers the federal Board "to cede to
such [local] agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry" under
the Act "unless" the local statute or interpretation "is inconsistent with
the corresponding provision of this Act ... ." The reason for withdrawing
the exclusive power of the Board, but still retaining exclusive jursidiction
vis-a-vis states, is not a play upon words, and the conference report by
the House Managers, who met with the Senate's representatives to iron
out disagreements between the bills passed by their respective bodies, so
discloses."2 In other words, federal (Board) jurisdiction has never been
Congressionally rejected or disavowed completely so as to permit states
automatically to enter, but, insofar as foremen or supervisors are here
discussed, is this the federal intent as to them (so as to demonstrate that
the Safeway decisions are incorrect)? Again the congressional desire is
disclosed by its own choice of language,s' with no distinction being made
between representation and unfair labor practice proceedings, 4 and while
of the new statute, and the case was now before the Court of Appeals on such
remand. "We believe," said the intermediate court, "that it is clear that Con-
gress . . . intended that employers be free in the future to dsicharge super-
visors for joining a union, and to interfere with their union activities. The
cease and desist provisions of the Board's order would enjoin the respondent
from engaging in conduct in the future which is now lawful." At p. 579. In the
companion case to the Bethlehem Steel, i.e., Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp. v.
Kelly, decided in the same opinion, the employer sought a declaratory judgment
and a restraining order from the state court to .prevent the state board from
determining the issues.
82H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) p. 52: "The House bill
omitted from section 10(a) of the existing law the language providing that the
Board's power to deal with unfair labor practices should not be affected by other
means of adjusting or prevention, but it retained the language of the present act
which makes the Board's jurisdiction exclusive. The Senate amendment, because
of its provisions authorizing temporary injunctions enjoining alleged unfair
labor practices and because of its provisions making unions suable, omitted the
language giving the Board exclusive jurisdiction of unfair labor practices, but
retained that which provides that the Board's power shall not be affected by
other means of adjustment or prevention. The conference agreement adopts
the provisions of the Senate amendment. By retaining the language which pro-
vides the Board's powers under section 10 shall not be affected by other means
of adjustment, the conference agreement makes clear that, when two remedies
exist, one before the Board and one before the courts, the remedy before the
Board shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, other remedies."
83 See also H.R. REp. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) p. 40, com-
menting upon "The rule of exclusive jurisdiction" under the federal act, which
"is an illustration of such a policy. It can readily be seen what mischief might
be wrought if, for example, foremen should be subject to State law at the same
time that the workers they supervise are subject to national law. Moreover, the
bill herewith reported very definitely states a national policy in respect of
organization and collective bargaining by foremen."
84 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) p. 26, that the proviso
"permits the National Board to allow State labor-relations boards to take final
jurisdiction of cases in border-line industries . . . "
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the Senate minority report inveighed against the exclusion of supervisors
(foremen) from the protection of the proposed Act, they agreed "with
the majority that it is desirable thus [by section 10(a)] to clarify the
relations between the National Labor Relations Board and the various
agencies which States have set up to handle similar problems." The pro-
posal is made necessary by the decision of the Supreme Court in the
companion representation case to the Bethlehem case. 5 The federal
policy concerning (interstate) foremen as employees is exclusively for
Congress to determine,es and the particular intent and policy have been
clearly enough expressed to find that, absent a cession under section
10(a)'s proviso, state boards and courts have no power or jurisdiction
ordinarily to interfere in the labor relations between an employer and
his supervisors.8
7
If this analysis is correct then the reasoning in the Safeway Stores
case is irrcorrect, but, regardless, another avenue of the federal-state con-
flict over jurisdiction is indicated. This avenue involves the question
whether, and to what extent, a state's policy, and common law decisions
and statutory enactments, can exist independently of or in conjunction
with the federal law; in the Safeway case the state's policy was judicially
determined and made the -basis for a judicial injunction to enforce such
(judicial) policy, but the effect of the federal policy and statute was held
inapplicable (although, as we have seen, wrongly so). How far, if at all,
may a state law, or a state judicial decision, go and yet not conflict with
the federal law and policy? We discuss first the question of a federal
conflict with local enactments, thus involving the statutory law, and then
with local judicial decisions based upon and involving the common law.
e.) The positive jurisdiction of the Labor Board: preemption by federal
statute and Board action-the state's commerce powers.
In the La Crosse Telephone case, decided in 1949, the Supreme
Court felt that a Wisconsin board's certification of a union as the
employees' representative could not stand when, under the original
Wagner Act, "the industry is one over which the National Board has
consistently exercised jurisdiction."8 8 The result so reached, continued
the opinion, was not changed by the 1947 amendments permitting cession,
851bid., at p. 500.
86N.L.R.B. v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. supra note 81, at pp. 578-9:
"Whether it is desirable or undesirable, as a matter of policy, for foremen to or-
ganize and be classified as employees, is for Congress, not the Court, to determine,"
citing the Packard Motor Car case, supra note 66, at pp. 490, 493.
87 See, e.g., note 95, infra, and also note 16, supra, at pp. 114-5.
8 8 La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. W.E.R.B., 336 U.S. 18, 25 (1949). There the
state act permitted a majority vote of employees to constitute that group a unit,
whereas "The federal act leaves that matter to the discretion of the board....
[The state act thus] freezes into a pattern that which the federal act has left
fluid." At pp. 25-26. The court also found that federal administrative practice
disposed of cases without formal orders so that a state certification on a different
basis might easily disrupt this federal method.
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for none appeared to have occurred. "We are satisfied with the wisdom
of the policy underlying the Bethlehem Case and adhere to it," 9 con-
cluded the court. The following year the Supreme Court felt that the
labor practices of employers had been made. subject to the exclusive juris-
diction and regulation of the Labor Board under the federal statute, for
it now reversed a Wisconsin board's ruling whereby an employer was found
guilty of a state unfair labor practice, citing BetMehem and La Crosse in
its per curiam decision;"0 three months later a state requirement that a
strike vote of a majority of the employees be a condition precedent to any
strike was denounced because "Congress has not been silent on the sub-
ject of strikes in interstate commerce," namely, by establishing its own
procedures in section 8 (d), forbidding strikes for certain objectives,
section 8 (b) (4), or which might create a national emergency, section 206
et seq. "None of these sections can be read as permitting concurrent state
regulation of peaceful strikes for higher wages. Congress occupied this field
and closed it to state regulation." 91 But what of a situation involving a
state's police powers when exercised to prevent the impairment or cessa-
tion of vital services and supplies, e.g., transit and gas? In 1941 the Su-
preme Court denounced a Wisconsin law wbich prohibited strikes against
public utilities and required compulsory arbitration after collective bar-
gaining had failed, the reason being that section 7 of the federal act
expressly safeguarded for all (interstate) employees the right to strike
and that Congress had qualified this right by section 8(d)'s requirements
of notice and section 8(b) (4 )'s prohibitions where unlawful objectives
were involved; therefore, concluded the court, federal occupation of the
field closed it to state regulation, quoting the O'Brien language just set
forth.9 2
89 Ibid., at p. 26.
90 Plankinton Packing Co. v. W.E.R.B., 358 U.S. 953 (1950). In Amalgamated
Ass'n. of Street, Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. W.E.R.B., 340 U.S.
383, 390 (1951), fn. 12, Chief Justice Vinson wrote that the Plankinton case
involved a state board's "reinstatement of an employee discharged because of his
failure to join a union, even though his employment was not covered by a
union shop or similar contract. Section 7 . . .not only guarantees the right of
self-organization and the right to strike, but also guarantees" the right to refrain
therefrom, "at least in the absence of a union shop" etc. "Since the N.L.R.B.
was given jurisdiction to enforce the rights of employees, it was clear that the
Federal Act had occupied this field to the exclusion of state regulation. Plankinton
and O'Brien both show that states may not regulate in respect to rights guaran-
teed by Congress in §7."
91 International Union, UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457 (1950), citing the
Plankinton, La Crosse, and Bethlehem cases, as 'well as Hill v. Florida.
92 The Amalgamated Association case, supra note 90, at p. 390. Vinson's
opinion then went into a discussion of why public utilities were to be treated no
differently than all national manufacturing organizations and concluded with
examples of the direct conflict in the record between the two acts and policies.
There is, however, another aspect to be discussed. The Chief Justice overruled
the argument that this was local emergency legislation, comparable to the federal
legislation in §206 of the Taft-Hartley Act, by pointing out that it was "a com-
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These opinions and decisions are not difficult to comprehend,
although difficulty of application to particular facts is always present,
3
but the 1949 4lgoma Plywood case 9 creates a slight ripple upon the
sea of understanding. There a majority of seven felt that even though
federal certification of a union had occurred, and a closed-shop
agreement which was valid under the original Wagner Act had been
entered into, Wisconsin could still hold an employer guilty of an unfair
labor practice for discharging an employee who refused to pay union dues
where the state law required such an agreement to be ratified by a two-
thirds vote of the employees before it could become effective. The effect
of the Taft-Hartley amendments in section 10(a), considered above, was
discussed, but the conclusions reached were not disturbed;"5 the argument
that new section 14(b), which permits state laws which prohibit union-
shop agreements to supersede federal policy within that locality, was
effective only when such a law prohibited, but not when it regulated,
these agreements, was rejected because of the section's legislative history;
and, finally, it was held that "The character of activities left to State
regulation is not changed -by the fact of certification." 6
prehensive code for the settlement of labor disputes between public-utility em-
ployers and employees." He then went on to say that "In any event" there was
federal preemption. The inference drawn is that while no emergency legislation
was here involved, still any such emergency statute woud have a like fate had
it conflicted.
93 By this time the states were, to put it mildly, confused. Thus Minnesota
and Mississippi held that states no longer had jurisdiction of any conduct which
violated any provision of the federal act, while Alabama, Massachusetts, Missouri
and New York held otherwise. Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46
N. XV. 2d 94 (1950) ; Reed Constr. Co. v. Building Council, 27 L.R.R.M. 2161 (Miss.
1950); Montgomery Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co.,
256 Ala. 678, 57 So. 2d 112 (1951) (see also note 126, infra), Thayer v. Binnall,
326 Mass. 467, 95 N.E. 2d 193 (1950); Kincaid-Webber Motor Co. v. Quinn,
362 Mo. 375, 241 S.W. 2d 886 (1951); Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y.
300, 101 N.E. 2d 697 (1951).
94 Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. W.E.R.B., 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
9rIbid., at p. 313: "One phrase, however, reinforces those conclusions; that
is the phrase 'inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act.' These
words must mean that cession of jurisdiction is to take place only where State
and federal laws have parallel provisions. Where the State and federal laws
do not overlap, no cession is necessary, because the State's jurisdiction is un-
impaired. This reading is confirmed by the purpose of the proviso in which the
phrase is contained; to meet situations made possible by" the Bethlehem Steel case,
"where no State agency would be free to take jurisdiction of cases over which the
National Board had declined jurisdiction."
00Ibid., at p. 315. Certification merely disclosed that the employer and the
uni6n were subject to federal law, continued the opinion, so that "as to this
employer the State shall not impose a policy inconsistent with national policy, or
the National Board's interpretation of that policy," citing the Hill and Bethlehem
cases as well as the La Crosse case. The "enumeration" of unfair labor practices
"over which the National Board has exclusive jurisdiction does not prevent the
States from enforcing their own policies in matters not governed by the federal
19s55
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
f.) The positive jurisdiction of the Labor Board: preemption by federal
statute and Board action-the state's traditional police powers.
Apart from a conflict between federal and state labor relation
statutes, there is the vast area of state decisional (and statutory) law, in
general, which may impinge upon or conflict with federal policy and
law. Since most states do not have labor relation acts or boards the bar-
gaining relations between local employers and employees are supervised
and controlled by particular statutes and judicial decisions; even where
local acts and boards are found the decision law, especially with respect
to picketing, is of vital importance. This area is therefore of major con-
cern but the present examination must be limited in scope to those
situations in which a conflict with the Federal Act or Board is involved.
Again congressional intent plays a large part in the discussion, and again
a state's power to act comes to the fore, but whereas it was the latter's
concurrent power over commerce which was previously of importance,
it may now be the state's police power which is the major peg to support
local action. A good deal of what can be set forth here concerning the
theoretical -background has already been discussed, so that we are not
upon strange ground; for example, the state's power to act upon inter-
state commerce is not always affected by congressional action, for the
judiciary has said that the nation is concerned primarily with purpose,
not method, and absent congressional preemption the states may charac-
terize any wrong of any kind as an unfair labor practice or otherwise
seek to prevent or give relief from or because of it. Whereas the judicial
resolution of the commerce conflict involved the interstate-intrastate
dichotomy of a concurrent power, so that local action was permitted where
national preemption or policy had not forbidden it, the present approach
involves a federal commerce power versus a state's police power, likewise
previously mentioned but only in passing. This concept starts with a
federal exercise of a conceded power over interstate commerce (and
reaching intrastate, also, as disclosed in subd.1), with the states now
acting under their police powers; in the 1942 Allen-Bradley case, pre-
viously discussed in conjunction with Hill v. Florida, the federal un-
amended statute then contained a listing of only employer unfair labor
practices in section ., so that a state law could hold a union guilty of an
unfair labor practice involving mass picketing, violence, etc.; now, how-
ever, section 8 contains a separate listing of union unfair labor practices,
so that Congress may not alone have positively preempted that field of
legislation also but, even if it has not, it may have now disclosed a negative
intent to prevent state action under the latter's police powers.
The Wisconsin Auto Workers case, decided in 1949, is of interest.
There a bare majority upheld a Wisconsin board's order preventing
individual defendants and members of a union, certified as the bargaining
law," said the court, at p. 314, and §14(b) granted the states permission "to
carry out policies inconsistent with the Taft-Hartley Act itself," albeit within
its limited application.
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representatives of the Briggs & Stratton Corporation's employees -by the
Federal Board, from engaging in "quickie" strikes." "The substantial
issue", wrote Mr. Justice Jackson, "is whether Congress has [affirma-
tively] protected the union conduct which the state has forbidden, and
hence the state legislation must yield.""8 The answer was sought (as
with the approach in the factual situation in the Bethlehenmi and other
cases) in a "clearly manifested" intent of Congress to exclude the states
from the exercise of their traditional police power control, but none was
found; "the conduct here described is not forbidden by this Act and no
proceeding is authorized by which the Federal Board may deal with it in
any manner. While the Federal Board is empowered to forbid a strike,
when and because its purpose is one that the Federal Act made illegal, it
has been given no power to forbid one because its method is illegal--even
if the illegality were to consist of actual or threatened violence to persons
or destruction of property. Policing of such conduct is left wholly to the
states."" ° Thus the Allen-Bradley (original Wagner Act) and Wis-
consin Auto Workers (amended Wagner Act) cases permit a state, by
its labor relation statute, and with its local board's processes, to prevent
activity condemned under its police powers (even though expressed in
such an act), so long as "There is no existing or possible conflict or over-
lapping between the authority of the Federal and State Boards, because
the Federal Board has no authority either to investigate, approve or forbid
the union conduct in question. This conduct is governable by the state or
it is entirely ungoverned." 1'' Thus both cases hold against fed.eral pre-
9 7 International Union, UAW, Local 232 v. W.E.R.B., 336 U.S. 245, 249
(1949), "The stratagem consisted of calling repeated special meetings of the
Union during working hours at any time the Union saw fit, which the employees
would leave work to attend."
98 Ibid., at p. 252. "No serious question is presented by the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution standing alone. It never has been thought [negatively] to
prevent the state legislatures from limiting aggression and substituting judicial
processes for personal vengeance."
09 At p. 254 the Bethlehem case was held "not analogous" to the instant case,
but this was because of the factual differences which the opinion now pointed
out. We are here speaking of an "approach" however, which is the same in both
cases.
100 Ibid., at p. 253. The court also pointed out that actual property damage
had occurred in this case. See also N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Co., 341
U.S. 665, 672 (1951), reiterating this view but pointing to §8(b) (1) (A) as a
possible source of Labor Board power to reach violence.
101 336 U.S. at p. 254. The balance of the opinion discusses the effect of
§§7 and 13 of the Federal Act, and the right of workers to strike, and states,
among other things, that "it is the objectives only and not the tactics of a strike
which bring it within the power of the Federal Board." At p. 263. This quickie
strike "was neither forbidden by federal statute nor was it legalized and approved
thereby. Such being the case, the state police power was not superseded by con-
gressional Act over a subject normally within its exclusive power and reachable
by federal regulation only because of its effect on that interstate commerce which
Congress may regulate." at p. 265.
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emption but distinguish between (federal) purpose and (state) method,
i.e., apparently (but, as we shall conclude, no longer) saying that the
Federal Act strikes at illegal purposes, whereas the states are free to
control illegal methods;1 2 from this point of view one could argue
that any state effort to control union conduct because of illegal motives
is to be denounced, and that all state effort to -control union conduct
because of illegal methods is to be upheld. This, however, is not a water-
tight compartmentalization, for state control of otherwise lawful union
conduct (e.g., peaceful picketing) has been upheld where no preemption
or proscription was claimed and the state's valid laws or policies were
being thereby subverted;"0 ' no federal intent is therefore apparent to
negate all state action, even though preemption has not taken place, i.e.,
the federal statute does not deal generally and in all respects with strikes
and picketing, so that states may deal with this conduct unless and to the
extent they are prohibited, e.g., the O'Brien case.
1 0 4
The Garner opinion, however, questionably suggests the possibility
of a somewhat different conclusion. There a trucking concern formed
a link to an interstate railroad, with four of its twenty-four employees
being union members; the union peacefully picketed the truckers, none
of these picketers being employees, with drivers for other carriers refusing
to cross these lines; as a result, almost 95% of the employer's business
was lost. The lower Pennsylvania equity court found that the union's
"purpose in picketing was to coerce petitioners into compelling or influenc-
ing their employees to join the union;" that a violation of the state's
labor relations act thereby resulted; and that an injunction should there-
fore issue. The state's Supreme Court ("quite correctly, we think," said
Mr. Justice Jackson for the unanimous bench) felt that the employer's
grievance fell within the jurisdiction of the Federal Labor Board to
prevent unfair labor practices so that state remedies were precluded. In
§8(b) (2) of the amended Wagner Act, pointed out the Justice, "Con-
gress has taken in hand this particular type of controversy where it affects
interstate commerce. In language almost identical to parts of the Penn-
sylvania statute, it has forbidden labor unions to exeri certain types of
102 See, however, note 121, infra.
103 E.g., beginning with Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490 (1949) (see note 109, infra, however), enjoining such picketing where
Missouri's antitrust laws were thereby violated, despite the alleged identification
of picketing with the constitutionally-protected free speech aspect thereof, thus
placing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), in its proper perspective;
for later illustrations see Building Service Employers International Union v.
Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., v.
Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Court 339 U.S. 460 (1950)
(compare this with New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552
[1938], a different approach to the same policy question). Of course, the
question of federal preemption may denounce what the due process clause per-
mits, when a plenary power is involved, as hinted in Note 109, infra.
104 Supra note 91.
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coercion on employees through the medium of the employer. It is not
necessary or appropriate for us to surmise how the National Labor
Relations Board might have decided this controversy had petitioners
presented it to that body. The power and duty of primary decision lies
with the Board, not with us. But it is clear that the Board was vested
with power to entertain petitioners' grievance, to issue its own complaint
against respondents and, pending final hearing, to seek from the United
States District Court an injunction to prevent irreparable injury to
petitioners while their case was being considered. The question then is
whether the State, through its courts, may adjudge the same controversy
and extend its own form of relief." "This case would warrant little
further discussion," continued Jackson, "except for a persuasively presented
argument," which he thereafter proceeded to reject, that the Federal
Board "enforces only a public right on behalf of the public interest, while
state [board or] equity powers are invoked by a private party to protect
a private right."' 0° Then, as obiter, he remarked: "The detailed pre-
scription of a [federal] procedure for restraint of specified types of
picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free of other
methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of the National Labor
Relations Act is not to condemn all picketing but only that ascertained
by its prescribed processes to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it
is implicit in the Act that the public interest is served by freedom of
labor to use the weapon of picketing. For a state to impinge on the area
of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of
federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes
or by methods which the Federal Act prohibits."""O4b If this approach is
sound then it would follow that much of what has been judicially de-
termined, and much of the jurisdiction of a state, is to be negated; the
reasoning is simple: in interstate commerce the federal government is
supreme; congressional intent to preempt or prohibit state action controls;
that intent may be expressed or implied; in the federal statute Congress
has listed a series of union acts (e.g., strikes or picketing or both) which
104a Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, AFL,
346 U. S. 485, 492 (1953). A lengthy analysis of this argument resulted in a
conclusion that "when federal power constitutionally is exerted for the protection
of public or private interests, or both, it becomes the supreme law of the land
and cannot be curtailed, circumvented or extended by a state procedure merely
because it will apply some doctrine of private right. To the extent that the
private right may conflict with the public one, the former is superseded. To the
extent that public interest is found to require official enforcement instead of pri-
vate initiative, the latter will ordinarily be excluded. Of course, Congress, in
enacting such legislation as we have here, can save alternative or supplemental
state remedies by express terms, or by some clear implication, if it sees fit. On the
basis of the allegations, the petitioners could have presented this grievance to the
National Labor Relations Board. The respondents were subject to being summoned
before that body to justify their conduct. We think the grievance was not subject
to litigation in the tribunals of the State." at pp. 500-1.
104bIbid., at pp. 499-500.
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are condemned and which may be proceeded against by the Board.
through its complaint processes and by its application to the judiciary for
a temporary injunction; if only picketing for these purposes is to be
denounced, and all other picketing is to be permitted, then picketing for
these, purposes can be acted upon only by the federal government and
states have no power thereon; 1 4'c the intent of Congress must therefore
be that picketing for all other purposes is not to be acted upon by the
federal government, i.e., the Labor Board, which has no jurisdiction in
these other fields; does the corollary follow that the states may or may not
denounce picketing in this last area? The implied desire of Congress is,
according to Jackson, against state action even where any other purpose
is involved, but he could just as well have opined that the federal intent
is to permit state enjoining of picketing where other purposes are found
to exist. And, as we have seen, this would have been more in line with
the views of the Supreme Court which, to this point, had adopted a
seemingly contrary view.10
4d
While the fork in the road of congressional intent has not yet been
so clearly marked that the Jackson dictum may be accepted or rejected,
the Capital Seruce case, decided May 17, 1954, but with the Justice
taking no part in its consideration or decision, is of aid. There an em-
ployer sought to stop secondary picketing by seeking a state injunction
and simultaneously filing charges with the Federal Board. The state
banned all picketing but a month later the General Counsel, by the
Regional Director of the Board, issued a complaint on a limited basis,
i.e., that picketing for informational purposes was lawful, but to induce
employees of other employers not to work was not, and the Director
now sought a federal temporary injunction to restrain this latter union
conduct. However, the state injunction blanketed even the otherwise
good union picketing, and so the Director simultaneously sought another
federal injunction against the employer enjoining him from enforcing the
state injunction. The Supreme Court now upheld the issuance of these
injunctions, holding that because of the vesting of dxclusive jurisdiction
in the Board "the intrusion of a state would result in a conflict of func-
tions" so that a federal district court must "have unfettered power to
decide for or against the union, and to write such decree as it deemed
10 4 I'This is the Garner holding, subject to the qualification expressed in
note 106, infra.
104d See, e.g., cases in note 103, supra, and also Local Union No. 10, United
Association of Journeymen Plumbers & Steamfitters v. Graham 345 U. S. 192
(1953), upholding the Virginia "right to work" law, although it may be objected
that §14(b) of the Federal Act specifically permits such local prohibitions of union
shops to be effective in interstate commerce situations, and that this case involved
a due process argument, i.e., the state law violated the 14th Amendment's pro-
hibition against state restrictions upon free speech. However, at p. 201, the
majority opinion reaffirmed the authority of a long line of decisions, including
those referred to above.
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necessary in order to effectuate the policies of the Act, [and] it must
be freed of all restraints from the other tribunal. ' 'l °4e
g.) The positive jurisdiction of the Labor Board: thi Garner ease and
the Board's primary jurisdiction.
All of these concepts were repeated in the 1953 Garner and 1955
Anheuser-Buseh opinions. The Garner opinion unanimously agreed with
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the state (whether by a board
or a court) could not prohibit peaceful picketing because "Congress has
taken in hand this particular type of controversy where it affects inter-
state commerce. In language almost identical to parts of the Pennsylvania
statute, it has forbidden unions to exert certain types of coercion on
employees through the medium of the employer."10 r5 There was thus no
instance of injurious conduct which the Federal Board was powerless
to prevent, nor did it encompass a situation of violence which was tra-
ditionally within the local government's powers, "Nor is there any sug-
gestion that respondent's plea of federal jurisdiction and pre-emption was
frivolous or dilatory, or that the Federal Board would decline to exercise
its powers once its jurisdiction was invoked." ' 6 Since the Federal Board
had primary jurisdiction, having been vested with power to entertain the
grievance, issue a complaint, and apply for a federal temporary injunc-
tion pending its determination, a state board or court could not, as could
not a federal court, in advance of some Board action (or indication of
inaction or rejection), adjudge the same controversy and extend its own
form of relief; the reason was that not alone had a federal substantive
rule of law been set forth, but, more important, a centralized administra-
tion of specially designed procedures was felt to be necessary for the
uniform application of the statute's substantive rules, and to avoid local
diversities and conflicts in remedies which might result."0 7 "The same
picketing may injure both public and private rights. But when two
separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity a conflict is
imminent. . . .But . . . there is no indication that the statute left it
open for such conflicts to arise."'
0 8
104eCapital Service, Inc. v. N.LR.B., 347 U.S. 501, 505-6 (1954), con-
cluding that "To exercise its jurisdiction freely and fully it must first remove
the state decree." See, however, N.L.R.B. v. Swift & Co. 130 F. Supp. 214, 28 Lab.
Cas. par. 69, 147 (D.C. Mo. 1955), where the Board's request to enjoin state action
was declined because of a possible due process argument, and also because
of Board rejection.
1 0 5 Supra note 104c., at pp. 488-9. In Pennsylvania the equity courts
enforce the labor relations statute, p. 498.
106 Ibid., at p. 488. See also Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction
Co., 346 U.S. 933 (1954), citing the Garner case and repeating this suggestion.
107 346 U. S. at p. 490. It is entirely possible that Congress might well have
been surprised at this analysis of its intent, but the present judicial approach is
excellently patterned upon that found in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
108 346 U.S. at pp. 498-9.
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The Inheuser-Busr case involved a jurisdictional conflict between
the Machinists and Carpenters Unions, with the brewery in the middle.
The employer, under pressure from the Carpenters, refused to sign a
contract giving the Machinists' members certain repair work when nec-
essary, and this latter union struck. On April 8, 1952, Anheuser-Busch
filed an 8(b) (4) (D) charge against the Machinists with the Board, and
on April 19th sought. and obtained a temporary and then permanent
injunction against the union but alleged not alone a violation of subd. D
but also of subds. A and B, of section 303(a)(1)(2) and (4), and "a
secondary boycott under the common law of the state of Missouri," as
well as amending its complaint shortly thereafter to include the addi-
tional claim that the Union's "conduct constituted an illegal conspiracy
in restraint of trade under Missouri common law and conspiracy statutes."
Thereafter the Labor Board held no "dispute" existed under section
8(b) (4) (D), and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the permanent
injunction because, no labor dispute existing, and the union's conduct
violating the state's act against restraints of trade, "the allegation on
which the injunction issued excluded the basis for a charge of an unfair
labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act."1 9 The Supreme Court
decided the preemption question against the State, for the Labor Board's
ruling involved only a subdivision D charge, whereas the employer's
complaint in the state court involved subds. A and B as well, and "The
point is that the Board, and not the state court, is empowered to pass
upon such issues in the first instance," i.e., the primary jurisdiction holding
of the Garner case; and even if there were no unfair labor practice
involved, continued the court, the Machinists' conduct "may fall within
the protection of §7. .. .
The emphasis in the Garner and Anheuser-Busch cases is upon the
primary jurisdiction of the Federal Board, i.e., that when a federal ques-
tion is, or even may be, involved, and Congress has set up a specialized
agency to deal with it, then it is the legislative intent that such agency
should get first crack at the problem, thereby permitting a uniform policy
to be developed at the national level in interstate commerce, applicable
throughout the country by whatever court or agency may seek to enforce
it. This concept of primary jurisdiction is not alone binding upon state
boards and courts but also upon federal courts; when to this is added
113 United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S.
656, 658, 659 (1954), respectively. Burton wrote the opinion, with Jackson not par-
relied upon by the Missouri court to sustain the injunction. "But Giboney was
concerned solely with whether the State's injunction against picketing violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. No question of federal preemption was before the
Court; accordingly, it was not dealt with in the opinion." See also the REPORT OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMrITEE TO STuDY THE ANTITRUST LAWs
p. 299, fn. 177 (1955), indicating a view that the Giboney case would today be held
covered by §8 (b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
110 75 Sup. Ct. at p. 486.
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the separate doctrine of the required exhaustion of administrative remedies
before appealing to the judiciary, then the two doctrines combine to pre-
vent, for any practical purposes, the ousting of the Labor Board's
jurisdiction by any federal district court."1'
h.) The positive jurisdiction of the Labor Board: the area of state ability
to act.
The "historic" and "traditional" area of state police power within
which the Allen-Bradley case permitted the states to function, as well
as the area outside federal pre-emption, as disclosed in the Wisconsin Auto
Workers case (together with the judicial nuances emanating from these
concepts), were thus somewhat modified by the primary jurisdiction
approach developed in the Garner and Ashe user-Busch cases. This latest
development, however, if pressed to its outermost limits, could well
dislodge all state efforts in the traditional and the non-preempted areas,
for the judiciary might easily find a congressional intent that its legis-
lation either covered the field completely, rejected any coverage what-
soever, or else permitted only partial federal control and none other.
And, since the federal commerce power penetrated deep into a state's
vitals (subdivision 1, supra), the judiciary would not be inclined to extend
federal labor relations control without simultaneously permitting an
extension of the federal commerce power control. How much these
and other logically drawn consequences weighed upon the judicial mind,
and how much other factors entered their deliberations (e.g., the con-
siderations set forth at the conclusion of subdivision 1), is speculative;"
the fact is that at the same term that Garner was decided, although six
months later, the Laburnum opinion was handed down. Here an afliliate
of the United Mine Workers had "threatened and intimidated [inter-
state] respondent's officers and employees with violence" and its conduct
was assumed by the court to constitute a violation of section 8 (b) (1) (A) ;
Laburnum did not seek Labor Board aid but sued in the Virginia courts
11 Suppose, however, that picketing of a neutral (which immediately sug-
gests a secondary boycott and an injunction under §8[b] [4] [A]) is not an
unfair labor practice or a protected concerted activity, may a state court enjoin
it? In Milwaukee Boston Store Co. v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers,
Branch 16, AFL, 27 Lab. Cas. par. 69, 114 (1955), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
said: "Until such time as the United States Supreme Court has ruled to the
contrary, we believe it to be our duty to hold that there has been no pre-emption
by Congress over the type of secondary picketing of neutrals herein enjoined
by the trial court in carrying out the policy of this state as expressed in its statutes
prohibiting the same. We hope the United States Supreme Court will pass
directly on this important question in the not too distant future."
112 Consider, for example, the argument that the appointment of a Republican
to the office of Chief Justice thereafter resulted in a revulsion against Garner,
even though 4nheuser-Busch had to follow in its footsteps. The fact is, however,
that Chief Justice Warren sat on the Garner bench and that it was a unanimous
opinion, including all Democrats and Republicans on the court, and that the
Jnheuser-Busch case was likewise such a decision except that Black concurred
and Harlan, just appointed, did not participate.
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for damages, alleging a common law tort action; the union now claimed,
and the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether, the Federal
Board had "exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter so as to pre-
clude the State Court from hearing and determining the issues in a com-
mon-law tort action based upon this conduct?"'a Note that whereas Gar-
ner spoke of primary jurisdiction, Laburnum spoke of exclusive jurisdiction;
the distinction is important, and in subdivision d of this article we have
differentiated between these terms. In other words, while Garner forbade
the states from initially acting upon condurt which possibly could be made
the basis of Board action, e.g., the prevention of the listed unfair labor
practices, it was now contended "that state courts are excluded also from
entertaining common-law tort actions for the recovery of damages caused
by such.conduct." The Court rejected this plea and differentiated the two
cases thus:
In the Garner Case, Congress had provided a federal
administrative remedy, supplemented by judicial procedure for
its enforcement, with which the state injunctive procedure con-
flicted. Here Congress has neither provided nor suggested any
substitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting
damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct. For us to cut
off the injured respondent from this right of recovery will
deprive it of its property without recourse or compensation.
[I.e., the law would be unconstitutional.] To do so will, in
effect, grant the petitioners immunity from liability for their
tortious conduct. We see no substantial reason for reaching such
a result. The contrary view is consistent with the language of
the Act and there is positive support for it in our decisions and
in the legislative history of the Act."
But suppose Congress had provided a remedy for the damages
suffered because of such tortious conduct? Then, reasoned the court by
analogizing to section 303(b) which gives a cause of action for injuries
suffered by violations of section 8(b) (4), there would be assurance of
uniformity in rights of recovery in federal or state courts which would
preclude other like remedies. "On the other hand, it is not consistent to
say that Congress; in that section [303(b)], authorizes court action for
the recovery of damages caused by tortious conduct related to secondary
boycotts and yet without express mention of it, Congress abolishes all
common-law rights to recover damages caused more directly and fla-
grantly through such conduct as is before us." Nor, continued the opinion,
does the Board's powers under section 10(c), to issue a cease and desist
order against such conduct, mean that the states were ousted from
113 United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S.
656, 658, 659 (1954), respectively. Burton wrote the opinion, with Jackson not
participating and Douglas (Black concurring) writing a dissenting opinion.
114Ibid., at pp. 663 and 6634, respectively. The opinion then quoted from
the Garner case, including therein quotations from the Wisconsin Auto Workers
and Allen-Bradley cases, and then pointed out that the Act set up no method
for compensation except in a very minor way for employees.
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permitting this action, for "There is no declaration that this [Board]
procedure is to be exclusive." 1 5 Laburnum, in conjunction with the
cases heretofore discussed, somewhat clarifies the pattern emerging from
the opinions, for the federal statute is now to be set up as a base upon
which all state action is to stand or fall. For example, does the state law
or board or judicial action parallel and collide with the Federal Board
or judicial possible action; if so, then the state is bereft of such power to
act and cannot, for example, restrain picketing, even if its own laws are
violated.116 Or, does the federal statute grant relief of a nature other than
the Federal Board can grant, e.g., a damage suit under section 303 (b);
if so, then local action in this respect is also forbidden. However, suppose
no recourse to the statute or Board aid is possible when certain conduct
occurs; in such event the localities have power (unless otherwise re-
strained) to control this conduct by their own unfair labor practices,
injunctions, etc. And, following along this approach, even if Board aid
is possible, -but only of a limited nature, state action which supplements
this and does not interfere or diminish or prevent the federal effort is
permitted, as is state action when no such Board action or federal court
suit is possible."' These are generalities, of course, and the statements
115 Ibid., at pp. 666 and 667, respectively. Continuing, at pp. 668-9, the
court quoted from S. REP. No. 105, and from Senator Taft's remarks in Congress,
to show that "There is no reason in the world why there should not be two
remedies for an act of that kind." The latter's remarks, 93 CONG. REC. 4024 (1947).
The dissent contained this statement: "I think that for each wrong which the
Federal Act recognizes the parties have only the remedy supplied by that Act ..
At p. 671.
116 E.g., Jack Cooper Transport Co., Inc. v. Stufflebeam, 26 Lab. Cas. par.
68, 488 (1954) ; Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, etc. v. Whitfield Transportation, Inc.
27 id. par. 68, 863 (1954); Precision Scientific Co. v. International Union, 2 Ill.
App. 2d 531, 120 N.E. 2d 356 (1954). In Your Food Stores of Santa Fe, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Local No. 1564, 124 F. Supp. 697 (D.C. N.M. 1954), the employer's
original effort to obtain a state injunction against picketing proved unsatisfactory,
as the unfair labor practice was held to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Federal Board (the federal district court so held, the case having been removed) ;
thereafter the employer sought a state injunction on the ground of trespass, the
Federal Board rejected a union charge because of its jurisdictional standards (subd.-
3, infra), and the court now refused the union's plea that the state injunction be
halted. The court felt the Board's rejection and the Laburnum decision were
determinative; it is suggested that while the former may be a good basis for the
decision, the latter is not, for the court is now making the name one gives to
conduct determinative of the question of jurisdiction. Since the Federal Board could
take jurisdiction and apply for a federal injunction even during the pendency of its
proceedings, the same local relief could be duplicated federally. Therefore, the
possibility of federal action should have resulted in a dismissal of the state
trespassing request (of course, we assume the jurisdictional standard question is
not involved).
117E.g., Buffalo Arms, Inc. v. Molony, 26 Lab. Cas. par. 68, 637; Wortex
Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 380 Pa. 3, 109 A. 2d 815 (1954); Benjamin v.
Foidl, 379 Pa. 540, 109 A. 2d 300 (1954); Arnold Bakers, Inc. v. Strauss, 138
N.Y.S. 2d 404 (1955), citing Isbrandtsen Co. v. Schelero, 118 F. Supp. 579
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must be translated into cases and applied to fact situations, with refinement
in these broad analyses occurring.
i.) Recapiulation and conclusions.
From all that has been discussed it appears that certification and
unfair labor practice conflicts are approached from the same point of
view although a somewhat firmer treatment is reserved for the former,
it being kept somewhat exclusively within the national fold whereas the
latter may or may not be locally treated. "The States are free (apart
from preemption by Congress) to characterize any wrong of any kind
by an employer to an employee, whether statutorily created or known
to the common law, as an 'unfair labor practice'." ' Thus the mere
enumeration of employer and union unfair labor practices does not
ipso facto disclose a congressional intent to prevent or to preempt state
action which may be in addition to such federal law, or distinct from it;
the intent of the federal legi'lature must still be sought in every situation
yet to arise. 19 but obviously, as in the Garner or Wisconsin Public Utility
(E.D. N.Y. 1954); United Mineral & Chemical Corp. v. Katz, 118 F. Supp. 433
671 (E.D. N.Y. 1954); Willoughby Camera Stores v. Dist. No. 15, International
Ass'n. of Machinists, 205 Misc. 455, 129 N.Y.S. 2d 734 (1954). The federal Act
thus does not exclude the states from this traditional jurisdiction of an action to
restore a union member to membership where he alleges a wrongful expulsion.
Real v. Curran, 138 N.Y.S. 2d 809 (1955). In this case the court found that the
conduct complained of was within the contemplation of §8(b) (2) but that only two
of the three items of relief were within the federal Board's power, it not being
able to restore to membership although it could compel back pay and reinstatement
to job. It was therefore concluded that the federal Act did not exclude the state
from jurisdiction, following Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 275 P. 2d
440 (Wash. 1954). If, of course, a federal unfair labor practice does not also
violate a state law, the latter's courts will not award damages. Garmon v. San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 273 P. 2d 687 (Cal. 1954).
See also International Plainfield Motor Co. v. Local No. 343, UAW-CIO,
123 F. Supp. 683 (D.C. N.J. 1954), where exclusive federal jurisdiction of damage
suits against unions was found in a breach of contract case (a no-strike clause
was breached), with the court apparently permitting a simultaneous suit against
the union officials, as individuals, in the state courts because no such action was
possible under the Taft-Hartley Act. For reasons analogous to those voicing
criticism of the Safeway Stores case, subd. d, supra, this decision appears unsound.
If it is the subject matter which is the basis of a conflict, then persons involved
are immaterial. While this might superficially permit a bankrupt union to protect
solvent officials, the question is not so simply put and answered, for in §301(b)
Congress has expressed a policy that only unions be sued and be liable for breach
of contract cases.
118Algoma Plywood & Veneer case, supra note 94, at pp. 305-6.
119 In the 4nheuser-Busch case, supra note 109, at p. 487, Frankfurter wrote
that "Congress did not exhaust the full sweep of legislative power over industrial
relations given by the Commerce Clause." It "outlawed some aspects of labor ac-
tivities and left others free for the operation of economic forces. As to both cat-
egories the areas that have been preempted by federal authority and thereby
withdrawn from state power are not susceptible of delimitations by fixed metes
and bounds. Obvious conflict, actual or potential, leads to easy judicial exclusion of
state action." The Garner opinion, supra note 104a, at p. 488, states the Federal
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cases, an outright conflict must be resolved in favor of the federal statute
and, as in the Wisconsin Transit case, the positive guarantees of section
7, or, as in the Plankinton case, its negative guarantees, cannot 'be im-
paired by local action of any kind.'" In other words, the federal gov-
ernment's plenary commerce powers have been statutorily exercised over
labor relations so as to:
(I) Mandate to a federal Board jurisdiction and power to act
within a limited area, but within this area it is supreme;
(2) Mandate to employees the positive and negative rights expressed
in the federal statute (in addition to any constitutional rights which must
be separately considered);
(3) Thereby withdraw from states the power, whether by statute,
board, or court action, to infringe upon the individuals' (positive or
negative) rights, or the jurisdiction and powers of the federal Board,
whether to certify or to hold an unfair labor practice has been committed;
(4) Express a desire, by these mandates and -by other factors, that
a uniform national policy substantively and procedurally (remedies) 2 '
is desired, and that states are not to infringe upon this policy area;
Act "leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us
how much." Thus concluded the Justice. "This prenumbral area can be rendered
progressively clear only by the course of litigation." In other word, a case-by-case
determination must retain a fluid area for judicial determinations and even
reversals of its own opinions.
120 "When it amended the Federal Act in 1947, Congress was not only
cognizant of the policy questions that have been argued before us in these cases,
but it was also well aware of the problems in balancing federal-state relation-
ships which its 1935 legislation had raised. The legislative history of the 1947
Act refers to the decision of this Court in Bethlehem Steel Co. . . . and, in, its
handling of the problems presented by that case, Congress demonstrated that it
knew how to cede jurisdiction to the states. Congress knew full well that its labor
legislation 'preempts the field that the act covers in so far as commerce within
the meaning of the act is concerned' and demonstrated its ability to spell out with
particularity those areas in which it desired state regulation to be operative.
This Court, in the exercise of its judicial function, must take the comprehensive
and valid federal legislation as enacted and declare invalid state regulation which
impinges on that legislation." The .4malgamated .4ss'n. case, supra note 90, at
pp. 397-8.
121 It was previously said that both the Allen-Bradley and Wisconsin Auto
Workers cases held against federal preemption and distinguished between
federal purpose and state method, i.e., the former struck at illegal motives and
permitted the latter to control illegal conduct. These were 1942 and 1949 cases,
respectively, and the developments of the past six years have either rejected this
tentative judicial exploration into a federal-state rendering, or else a more
sophisticated understanding of Congressional intent has required a reconsideration
and reevaluation of concepts and approaches.
There is also the question of positive and inferred Congressional intent
which, when found, may or may not permit state action. For example, §14(b) of
the Taft-Hartley Act permits states to outlaw union-shop clauses in collective
bargaining agreements which cover interstate employees, thereby making federal
policy subject to state desire. In the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. ch. 8, §2,
Eleventh, union shop agreements are permitted "Notwithstanding any other
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(5) Inform the local judiciary that whenever employer or union
conduct is (possibly) subject to whatever relief the federal Act may
afford, it is outside state authority;1
22
(6) Make not a probability but the possibility of Board acceptance
of jurisdiction a sufficient basis for ousting states of jurisdiction to act;"
(7) Place upon state courts, as well as upon federal courts, the
initial burden that only the latter have borne in the past, i.e., determine,
on the pleadings, "whether the subject matter is the concern exclusively
of the federal Board and withdrawn from the State;' 24
(8) Have state courts and boards renounce, when the Board's
primary jurisdiction is determined, 1 25 any local jurisdiction over any
request of them for any action upon any conduct which comes within
the first five items in the above enumeration;121
(9) Permit local statutory or judicial action in commerce fields
provision of this Act, or of any other statute or law . . . of any State," and it has
been held that this provision cannot supersede a state's right-to-work law, and
that it can and does. Hanson v. Union Pacific Ry., 24 Lab. Cas. par. 68,095
(Neb., 1954), and Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 26 id. par. 68,640 (Va.,
1954) respectively, both nisi prius courts. It is submitted that the latter decision
is the correct one and follows not alone the express language of the statute, but
also the intent of Congress which desired uniformity in railroad labor relations.
See, e.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 11 (1939), for language descriptive of
the necessity for federal control.
122 Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S.
813, 75 Sup. Ct. 452, 454 (1955), referring to the Alnheuser-Busch case. See, how-
ever, Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D. N.Y. 1951),
where it was held that §301 had preempted the field so that states could no longer
enforce these agreements; a better conclusion with better reasoning is General
Bldg. Contractors' Ass'n. v. Local Unions etc., 370 Pa. 73, 87 A. 2d 250 (1952),
permitting a state injunction in violation of a collective bargaining agreement,
the court reasoning that §301 involved only damage suits and no congressional
policy to preempt the field of equity suits could be inferred. See also Real v.
Curran supra note 117.
123 Supra note 106.
1 2 4 The -nheuser-Busch case, supra note 109, at p. 487.
12 5 The local authorities must initially determine their own jurisdiction,
subject to eventual Supreme Court ruling, and the "ascertainment of preemption
under the Taft-Hartley Act is [not] self-determining or even easy. . . . What
is within exclusive federal authority may first have to be determined by this Court
to be so." Richman Bros. case, supra note 122, at p. 455.
126 A state may conceivably thumb its nose at this plea for renunciation for,
under the holding in Montgomery Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Ledbetter
Erection Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 178 (1952), a temporary injunction issued by a
state court is not such a "final judgment or decree" within 28 U.S.C. §1257 as
gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review. However, the Labor Board may
seek a federal injunction when its processes have been invoked, Capital Service, Inc.
v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 501 (1954), although when its favors are not sought there
is apparently no efficacious remedy. Richman Bros. case, supra note 122, at p. 457.
Of course Congress may amend if state courts abuse this freedom, but the
"scout's honor" approach of the Supreme Court is apparently working out fairly
well in the state courts.
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not either federally preempted or prohibited, assuming no undue burden
upon interstate commerce results or other constitutional rights are not
involved;
(10) Include in these areas of local jurisdiction and power the
control of violence, mass picketing, abuse, threats, interference with
property, etc., for "Policing of such conduct is left wholly to the
states; 3)127
(11) Permit the states to select the method of control of the matters
over which they have jurisdiction e.g., by making them unfair labor
practices, by injunctions, suits for damages, etc. 128
(12) Forbid private persons from seeking federal injunctions pre-
venting others from utilizing state processes merely upon an allegation
that the state court is "wholly without jurisdiction of the subject matter,
having invaded a field preempted by Congress;" '129
(13) Authorize only the Labor Board, and then only when its
processes have been invoked, to seek injunctive relief;' 30
(14) Make the congressional intent the key to this entire field of
federal-state relations so as to permit state action in all areas not covered
by the federal statute, e.g., common law suits for damages for tortious
conduct even when such conduct is also a federal unfair labor practice; 131
127 Wisconsin Auto Workers case, supra note 97, at p. 253. See also the
International Rice Milling case, supra note 100, at p. 672.
128 See, e.g., W.E.R.B. v. UAW-CIO, 70 N.W. 2d 191, 28 Lab. Cas. par.
69, 191 (1955).
12 9 Richman Bros. case, supra note 122, at p. 455. This raises an interesting
question: if the allegations are supported by a wealth of undisputed factual proof,
must the federal district court grant the injunction? A careful reading of the
Richman and Anheuser-Busch cases, and especially the dissenting opinion of
Douglas in the former, conduces to a negative reply. The Richman opinion, at
p. 456, contains this statement: "To hold that the Taft-Hartley Act also authorized
a private litigant to secure interim relief would be to ignore the closely circum-
scribed jurisdiction given to the District Court and to generalize where Congress
has chosen to specify. To find exclusive authority for relief vested in the Board
and not in private parties accords with other aspects of the Act."
130 Under §10(j) of the amended Act the Labor Board has power, upon
the issuance of a complaint, to petition a federal district court for a temporary
injunction; however, under §10(1), charges brought under §8(b) (4) (A-C) may
be treated differently. Now only a charge is required to be filed, plus an investiga-
tion and then "reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a com-
plaint should issue," whereupon the Board "shall" petition for such an injunction.
See also statement in Richman case, supra note 122, at p. 456.
131 See, e.g., W.E.R.B. v. UAW-CIO, 26 Lab. Cas. par. 68, 711 (Wis.)
Circ. Ct. 1954), where state power to act over conduct such as violence was
upheld even though also an unfair labor practice federally, although where the
conduct is an unfair labor practice federally and locally, without the presence
of violence, etc., no state power existed to control the conduct. W.E.R.B. v.
Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 200, 267 Wis. 356, 66 N.W. 2d 318
(1954). See also Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 75 S. Ct. 488 (1955), where six Justices agreed that no suit could
be brought by a Union on behalf of its members for alleged "full salary" under
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(15) Apparently prevent these indenpendent common law suits at
the state level in section 8 (b) (4) situations, for these are covered by and
must conform to section 303.
In effect what is ultimately here concluded is that a complete
turn-about has occurred in the general approach to the problems created
by the federal-state conflict in labor relations. Prior to the present federal
regulation it was the localities which sought to control such relation, the
federal government entering on an ad hoc basis when its powers 32 or
laws133 were endangered or violated;"' 4 it was only when the general
pressures of war and depression, as well as the particular pressures of
public safety in transportation, were coupled with the realization that
a national phenomenon had, like Topsy, "jest growed," that Congress
sought to bring the multi-state chaos into national alignment. This was
partly because of the inability of the states to control a gargantuan union,
and it was thus for the same reasons that federal regulation of carriers
and business had occurred previously, as well as it occurred simultaneously
in the areas of social security, wages and hours, etc."'3 Congress, however,
never fully and completely preempted or forbade local regulation so
that, for example, states may require larger wage minimums, pay in-
creased unemployment compensation, have their own anti-discrimination
laws, nor did the federal legislation prevent local antitrust enforcement
because of the national Sherman Act. It is only in exceptional situations
that, in a field of concurrent power, federal preemption or forbidding
of state action has occurred, e.g., the Old Age and Survivors' benefits
program, and the general rule is to have the federal government move
cautiously and partially. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what did
a collective bargaining agreement, the reason being that §301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act did not envisage such a suit. There was disagreement, however, as to the
reasoning by Frankfurter in his majority opinion (two Justices joined in it), for
apparently Frankfurter opined that §301 was procedural only, and not substan-
tive, whereas Reed felt otherwise, and Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark
refused to discuss the question. The conclusion of the Court, however, was a
lack of federal jurisdiction in this type of suit, relegating the Union (if it could
do so) to a state suit. Other problems arise under §301, e.g., can an arbitration
clause be enforced when a suit thereunder is brought; can an injunction issue;
etc.? These are not discussed here, although bearing on the jurisdictional aspect,
because of the unsettled condition of lower and intermediate federal decisions.
132E.g., In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564- (1895).
133 E.g., a long line of antitrust cases involving labor, beginning with
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
134As it does even today in the present Taft-Hartley Act, e.g., under
the national emergency situation in §208.
135 See, for example, the present outcry against the inability of states to
control the evils resulting from pension and trust moneys which certain unior
officials have made a personal checking account. On the question of federal
regulation of carriers because of state inability, and the historical, economic,
political, and legal background, see Chapter III of this writer's forthcoming
"The Consumer's Interest In The Sherman Antitrust Act," to be published
January, 1956, by Dennis & Co., Buffalo, N.Y.
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occur in labor relations, for the 1935 Wagner Act struck only against
employer practices and the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act expanded this to
include union practices; furthermore, these listed practices on both sides
were not comprehensive but limited (or partial) regulations, and much
remained with the states. By analogy, the past and the current approaches
may be likened to definition by negation or affirmation; in negation both
persons must theoretically know the entirety of the universe so that one
may say (until the other understands), a horse is not a cow, not a fish,
etc., whereas in affirmation one need know little except the langukage
employed. So in the present area, if we desire to find out what a state
may do, i.e., define its jurisdiction and powers, we may either list (gen-
erally) each and every item open to it, proceeding on the assumption that
it may do nothing else, or say it may do nothing except what is expressly
permitted it to do, thereafter particularizing its powers in piece-meal
statutes, or we may even say that it may do and control everything not
specifically forbidden, or protected by the federal government. These
principles, it is felt, tally with those found in the cases, although the
first and second have never been utilized as either a judicial or legislative
approach in the past; rather, it is the third which is the constitutional
approach and which the judiciary began to employ with the turn of the
last century, the federal government thereby denying and negativing
particular state jurisdiction and powers, although today the trend, which
at first aped this early approach, seems to be veering toward greater state
autonomy and ability to control interstate commerce on the local level
(at least in the field of labor relations).
If this analysis be correct then the consequences are disastrous for the
national supremacy within its own bailiwick,"' 6 and it is the judiciary, not
the Congress, which must shoulder the onus for these results.1 37 For
example, the question of jurisdiction has been discussed in general, -but
we may point up one particular aspect which the judiciary leaves quite
unsettled. In an area of concurrent powers both federal and state courts
have jurisdiction over the subject matter, so that either may take hold
of the relation; if one has plenary power and may oust the other, the
intent so to do must be found to exist before jurisdiction may be said
to have been withdrawn; but, until such a finding is made, state courts
have jurisdiction of the relation in order to determine their own jurisdic-
1 3 6 Richman Bros. case supra note 122, at p. 461, per Douglas dissenting:
"That course undermines the federal regulation; it emasculates the federal
remedy . . . . The federal regulatory scheme cries out for protection against
these tactics of evasion."
137E.g., in the O'Brien case, supra note 91, at p. 459, per Vinson: "In the
Wisconsin Auto Workers Case, we concluded that the union tactic was 'neither
forbidden by federal statute nor was it legalized and approved thereby.' . . .
Clearly, we reaffirmed the principle that if 'Congress has protected the union
conduct which thd State has forbidden . . . the state legislation must .yield.' . . .
That principle is controlling here." While the principle is simply put and easily
understood it is the "if" which creates the problem.
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tion, i.e., to determine the congressional intent; 3 ' and if it is the federal
intent and policy to effect only a partial withdrawal of jurisdiction then
local courts definitely have unquestioned jurisdiction over the non-with-
drawn portion, and still have temporary jurisdiction in the other portion
until they have determined whether they have any jurisdiction therein. As
a corollary, once the Supreme Court has determined such federal intent
then all other courts must follow; and, in the ascertainment of the
congressional desire, there should be no judicial equivocation or use of
chameleon-like terms. Then how reconcile the practically-unanimous
federal and state agreement that the latter have always had, and still
have, a "traditional" jurisdiction over violence (the federal concern
ostensibly involving only purpose), with the statement that "The com-
plaint was not based upon violence, as such. To reach it, the complaint
more -properly would have relied upon §8(b) (1) (A) or would
have addressed itself to local authorities."' 39 For if violence as such can
be reached under the federal Act then states are ousted of jurisdiction; or,
even if the violence is to coerce for a purpose illegalized under section 8
(b) (4), or to prevent the enjoyment of rights under section 7, then states
cannot act thereon. Whether so undiluted or diluted, violence cannot be
attacked except through Board processes, and the results would -be truly
catastrophic. One rebels at these consequences and refuses to accept the
logic's end, whereupon we must return to our fork in the road and say
that Congress intended either to leave violence to state control or permit
certain aspects of it to be concurrently or solely controlled by the Board;
but if concurrent control of even one aspect is found then a possible
crazy-quilt of control emerges, and this abhorred consequence necessitates
a finding of sole control by the Board. But on this latter basis we are
again returned to our just-rejected consequence so that our conclusion,
based upon pragmatic considerations, must permit either sole local juris-
diction and control of violence (which is not so, as the Board has some
control) or, in some degree, permit the federal Board concurrent juris-
diction and power, and it is this last conclusion which is the more reason-
able in theory and in legislative intent and fact.
3.) THE DISCRETIONARY EXERCISE OF POWERS BY THE LABOR BOARD
If our preceding overall analysis is correct then it may be argued
that Congress, and only Congress, may determine, and delegate jurisdiction
and also decide the conflict between the federal and state governments
138E.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 290-3 (1947),
where the federal courts were held to have such temporary jurisdiction until
they determined whether they had any jurisdiction, "Although a different result
would follow were the question of jurisdiction frivolous and not substantial ... "
At p. 293.
139 International Rice Milling case, supra note 100, at p. 672, per Burton
for unanimous court. In fn. 5, citing the Wisconsin Auto Workers case, supra
note 97, at p. 253, the Justice quoted the purpose-method jurisdictional concept,
supra note 121.
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over the control of their labor relations; if it is the congressional intent
and desire that the federal Board have jurisdiction over, say, the collective
bargaining between railroad carriers and their employees, none can say
it nay, nor can anyone prevent it from giving the Board jurisdiction over
all businesses which come within the commerce power. Finally, and be-
cause of its plenary power over interstate commerce, Congress may dele-
gate to the Labor Board jurisdiction: of a mandatory nature over all such
businesses and (thereby) deny the states any power over them; over
part only (or even none), but still deny the states power; over part only,
but now give the states power over the (same and/or) other part; over all
or part, and now permit the Labor Board to determine whether it will
or will not exercise its power. It is this last situation which is examined
in this subdivision, for if that is the congressional intent then a corollary
and a question follow: as a corollary, Labor Board exercise of power
within its jurisdiction, regardless of how manifested, disclosing an intent
to settle federal policy within the area of its jurisdiction, withdraws
local jurisdiction and forecloses any state action; as a question, does
Labor Board rejection of jurisdiction, i.e., a refusal to exercise its powers
with or without disclosing what it conceives the national policy (or
interest) to be, permit states to enter this area? This question narrows our
analysis but does not yet pin-point it, for the corollary discloses that such
rejection or refusal may or may not indicate and settle federal policy.
It is only when the corollary and the question are combined that a
meaningful and pointed approach is possible, viz., that the Labor Board
has been given jurisdiction, but this does not automatically and forever
oust the states from exercising power within that delegated area where
the Board discloses that it will not exercise its powers within its jurisdiction
and a desire for local action therein may be inferred.
In other words the Board may be likened to an accordion player-
the limit of its jurisdiction is the furthest stretch of the instrument al-
though it has power to play one tune or another as it desires
(subject always to the ability of Congress to call that tune); when it
plays to the utmost then it is exercising its jurisdiction to the utmost and,
conversely, states cannot exercise any jurisdiction within such preempted
area; when the Board plays less then, inversely, states may control the
remainder of the interstate area over which jurisdiction has not been
exercised by the federal agency. Throughout, however, two questions of
intent must always be answered, did Congress intend to delegate such a
discretionary power to the Board to be able to refuse to exercise its juris-
diction with such a consequence and, if yes, then has the Board intended,
by such an exercise of its discretionary power, that the states move in?
There is one area of the agency's delegated power in which con-
gressional intent is definitely found that the Board may not be able to
exercise the kind of discretionary power just analyzed, i.e., the Board's
power to hold an election under section 209(b). There can be no question-
ing the lack of any state power to enter this field on the supposition that
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the Board, when called upon, would decline to act. There are other
such areas which can -be mentioned, e.g., the power of the Board to
formulate and promulgate rules and regulations, to seek temporary in-
junctions under section 10 (j and 1), or enforcement orders under sec-
tion 10(e). It is therefore obvious that Congress has not given the
Board a flexible charter to be manipulated as the agency sees fit, but
neither has an inflexible grant been made; what has occurred is that
whereas the states formerly controlled the general field of labor rela-
tions in the interstate area through various methods, e.g., court decisions,
injunctions, the federal government has now entered that area but
found that it either cannot effectively or does not desire to control local
matters. These latter are legally embraceable within the commerce
clause, as we have seen in subdivision 1 of this article, and therefore
within the federal jurisdiction if Congress desires to exercise its powers,
but they are factually local, may not require any federal policy to be
applied, may involve nothing or little of a national concern, and are
possibly a (cumulative) hindrance upon the evolution and effectuation
of a national labor relations policy. Administratively the agency would be
able to concentrate upon matters of national concern if these local matters
could be ignored; financially the agency has not been given a sufficiency of
funds to process these minor cases even if it desired to do so; and
economically (and politically), if not also judicially, state boards and
courts have a clearer understanding of local conditions than does the
national Board, where the local matters do not materially affect the na-
tional scene. From such a point of view it appears that the national labor
relations policy would be better served and aided by permitting states to
control such local matters, although with the federal Board retaining
power to step in whenever it appeared in the national interest to oust the
variegated state concepts and then formulate and apply a federal one.
Congress has gone along to a certain extent with this approach for,
in section 10(a), it has said that the Labor Board could cede its juris-
diction over cases to local control provided the state's act and interpreta-
tion were not contrary to the federal policy. This, of course, would impose
a national approach upon states in this interstate area and, to the extent
that a different and perhaps unequal treatment of purely state cases
would result if state policy were felt to be otherwise desirable, it is
not to the best interest of a state to change its policy solely for the purpose
of obtaining an increased jurisdiction. In effect this is the local view which
has prevailed so that, to date, no Board cession has odcurred. In the early
years of the new Act, however, this congressional effort to obtain uni-
formity in interstate matters, large and small, via section 10(a), was
dominant in Board thought; to what extent it influenced the first General
Counsel in challenging the existence of the discretionary type of power
just discussed is unknown. 4 What early occurred, however, was that
140 For discussions on this conflict see FoRKoscH, TREATIsE ON LABOR LAw,
§230, pp. 650-1 (1953).
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the Labor Board felt that it need not assert its powers just -because it had
jurisdiction and a charge was filed, whereas the General Counsel con-
tended that jurisdiction compelled exercise when a complaint had been
issued by him. Obviously the latter approach would have brought minnows
as well as whales into the Board's jurisdictional net, and to the extent
that it might have compelled states to seek Board cession under section
10(a), it would have somewhat effectuated congressional policy; to the
extent, however, that Congress had clamped down on Board functions
and staff operations through decreased appropriations, the General
Counsel's approach would have imposed an insuperable burden upon
the Board, resulted in an undoubted diminution in Board effectiveness,
hindered the development of a national policy, and otherwise had harm-
ful repercussions upon the federal labor relations approach. This conflict
between Counsel and Board thus involved not a question of personalities
(although to a degree this might have been true) but, basically, disclosed
a congressional desire to try one method and to have a stand-by substitute
in reserve if the first one failed. Since fail it did, the second method had
to be utilized, and so in place of direct Board cession we find an indirect
Board cession occurring, with states now setting their local policy im-
primatur upon the interstate area but, in the discretion of the Board, only
in those cases and to the extent it feels can not harm, even if it does not
effectuate, the national policy.
The accordion policy of the Labor Board is therefore a necessary
weapon to be used to strike down state incursions into the national area
when these draw blood. It is true that one consequence of this modem
sword of Damocles is to create confusion and uncertainty,141 and to
render wary state boards somewhat impotent to act, but the above analysis,
if correct, removes these fears. States may today, it is here opined, act
locally upon all interstate representation and unfair labor practice matters
over which they have concurrent jurisdiction and which the federal
Board has discretionarily refused to process, even though it has jurisdiction,
except where the Board has indicated that it does not desire local power
to be exercised.' 42
The factual development and application of this Board policy is
141 See, e.g., the discussion by Lorenz, Conflict, supra note 65. At p. 414 the
author writes: 'Especially did a union find it necessary to run to the National
Board if a case filed before the State looked dubious, in order to come within
the six-month statute of limitations under the National Act," §10(b). This refers
to the limitation upon the issuance of complaints where charges are filed more
than six months after the acts are committed.
142This Board desire may be because, for example, it does not wish the
subject matter to be locally touched, because it desires a national policy which
is yet to be developed, because it has a settled policy which it will apply when
it can, because of its inability to process matters due to personnel shortages due
to inadequate appropriations etc. Regardless of the reasons why the, fact is-
and the fact of this Board intent is a sufficient cause to reject local action. See
also note 174, infra.
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not difficult -to trace. It antedates the 1947 amendments, for under the
original Wagner Act the Board's members, in representation and unfair
labor practice cases, did not seek to control peripheral matters except
where the national interest required; the reasons were partly budgetary,'4 3
partly the tremendous increase in new cases in the 1945-1947 period, 4 4
and partly the necessity for developing a national policy. For example,
the construction field was not entered because of its high degree of
unionization and the existence of collective bargaining. However, by
1947, Congress had concluded that various union practices in the .building
trades, to illustrate, had to be curbed, although it also recognized that local
control of various matters should be encouraged, e.g., section 14(b), and
so new subd. (b) was added to section 8, castigating certain of these
union methods as unfair practices. The amended statute was nevertheless
unclear as to how far Congress desired the Board to exercise its conceded
jurisdiction and control "local" businesses; the General Counsel felt
that the Board should enter "to the full extent that the Act will permit,"
but the Board disagreed although, initially, a majority did assert its
jurisdiction over some relatively local matters, the dissenters contending,
however, that "The amended statute contains no language compelling a
sudden expansion of this Board's jurisdiction, nor can we discover new
policy considerations sufficient to warrant our intervening in a con-
troversy inherently local in character."' 45 The congressional mandate
and consequent direction to the Board to assert its power in the building-
construction industry was acknowledged, even by the dissenters, as being
143 See note 145, infra, and see MILLIS & BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER AcT TO
TAFT-HARTLEY pp. 61, 400-1 (1950) for background.
144 See 11th Annual Report (1947) pp. 68-9.
1 4 5 The Liddon White case, infra, at p. 1184. In December, 1941, in Newton
Chevrolet, Inc., 37 N.L.R.B. 334 (1941), the Board asserted its power over retail
automobile sales and servicing agencies, but this power was "quietly interred"
(Liddon White Truck Co., Inc. 76 N.L.R.B. 1181, 1184 [1948] [a dissent])
although as late as July, 1947, the Board directed an election where a local outfit
rebuilt and resold, at retail and by mail order, used auto parts, buying outside
the state over $100,000 of parts and selling outside the state over $200,000.
Warshawsky & Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 577 (1947). The following month, however, with
one dissent, the Board rejected power over a retail sales and servicing auto
agency where outside purchases were approximately $51,000 and outside income
was $189,000, of a total volume of business of $2,600,000. Herff Motor Co., 74
N.L.R.B. 1007 (1947). How much the 1941 assertion of power was spurred
by the increased appropriation of approximately $500,000 (Reilly also replaced
E. S. Smith in October) is conjectural; in 1947, however, the Taft-Hartley Act
became law although the Warshawsky and Herff cases were decided by the
three-man Board of Herzog, Houston and Reynolds, Houston dissenting in the
Herff case. In the first case under the new five-man Board, operating with a five
million dollar budget which was upped the following year by almost four and a half
million dollars, the Houston dissent apparently prevailed as Reynolds and the
two new appointees joined him, although Murdock deserted him and now dis-
sented with Herzog in the Liddon White case supra. The dissent contains the
following two paragraphs: "We would grant the Employer's motion to dismiss,
[Vol. 16
1955] JURISDICTION AND ITS IMPACT
"justified by special considerations,"' 46 but the "general change in policy"
was fought into the following year-47 when, because the employer's
operations were "essentially local in nature," a new majority declined
jurisdiction. 4 ' There thus evolved a Board approach which included a
continuing 1 49 general policy, to be developed and applied by the agency
rather than exercise jurisdiction in this case of a retail automobile dealer. We
do not question our colleagues' conclusion that it is constitutionally possible to
assert the Federal power here, but we say that it is administratively unwise to do
so. The fact that this Board may do something does not mean that it must or
should." "Although this case relates only to a retail automobile dealer, we also
voice concern at the general change in policy that it portends. Throughout 1945,
1946 and 1947 the old Board, in administering the Wagner Act, refrained from
exercising jurisdiction in situations that have an essentially local flavor," citing
cases in a footnote.
146The Liddon White case, supra note 145, at p. 1184, fn. 3: "The Board's
recent assertion of jurisdiction over the building-construction industry, which
appears to have more local attributes than the trade involved here, is justified by
special considerations. In enacting the amendments to the Act, the 80th Congress
directed particular attention to jurisdictional disputes and other practices that
were conspicuously characteristic of the building trades. If constitutional power
exists, as we believe it does, the Board would be derelict in its duty if it did not
exercise that power at a point that was the express subject of Congressional
concern."
147 Central Sash & Door Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 418, 420 (1948), the two dis-
senters referring to the Liddon White case for their reasons.
148Duke Power Co. 77 N.L.R.B. 652 (1948). The dissenters in the Liddon
White and Central Sash cases were now joined by Member Gray, with Houston
and Reynolds now becoming a minority and dissenting. This new policy was
followed in J. E. Stone Lumber Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 627 (1948) (Gray not participat-
ing), and Midland Bldg. Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 1243 (1948), (Houston not participating),
with fn. 1 at p. 1243 referring to 10 East 40th Street Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S.
578 (1945), and remarking: "Although our jurisdiction is broader than that
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and this decision is not decisive as to our legal
jurisdiction in this situation, the characterization of such an enterprise [operation
of an office building] by the Supreme Court as essentially local is of persuasive
significance in a policy determination in connection with the assertion of juris-
diction."
149 Pappas v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 125 F. Supp. 343, 348
(N.D. I1. 1954) : "Indeed, the Act of 1947 itself represents a comprehensive revision
of all federal legislation affecting labor disputes and the NLRB had decided
well before that date that it would not resolve disputes in the entertainment
industry. With this policy before it Congress decided to re-enact the jurisdictional
language of the former . .. Act without alteration. In the opinion of the court
this amounts to nothing less than Congressional ratification of the policy of the
NLRB." See also Hotel Association of St. Louis, 92 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1951), a 3-2
decision rejecting jurisdiction over the hotel industry, thereby continuing its
pre-1947 policy, and citing and quoting from Senator Tafts remarks that in
his "opinion the Act was never intended to cover the hotel industry." Member
Murdock, in that case, was a dissenter. This rejection of jurisdiction points up
the possibility of a change in policy, and the Miami Beach hotel strike which
began in April and still (in September) continues, found the Florida courts
enjoining the strikers, with the latter now appealing to the federal Board to
assert jurisdiction (which would destroy the basis for the state's assertion of
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under its generally delegated powers, and g special policy, mandated by
Congress, and to be applied regardless of the Board's policy views in the
matter and regardless of even decreased appropriations."' To the
Board's acquiescence to congressional desires that it extend and exercise
its power in the building-construction industry there was now added a
majority view that "the legislative history of the 1947 amendments is
replete with evidence that, especially where secondary boycotts were
concerned, Congress intended the Board to exercise its plenary power to
protect small and relatively local enterprises against the impact of
union boycotts aimed at the installation of materials furnished by primary
employers, the interstate character of whose business is clear."
151
In this additional approach there was concurrence and dissent,
1 62
the latter splitting on the question of congressional intent, thereby pointing
up the Board's own policy considerations which nevertheless were to be
subservient to the legislative desires. These general and special policies
jurisdiction). On August 26, 1955, by a 3-2 vote, the Board refused to change
its policy, adhering to its previous position. In re Local 255, Hotel & Restaurant,
etc. Union, 113 N.LR.B.
150 For example the first appropriation under the new Act was the high
for the Board since its inception, namely, $9,400 (thousands omitted); since then
the appropriations have been: fiscal 1950-$8,605; 1951-$8,582; 1952-$7,885;
1953-$9,000; 1954-$9,125; 1955-$8,400; 1956-proposed $8,150. The Board has,
nevertheless, continued to exercise its jurisdiction over building trades and
matters involving secondary boycotts, infra note 151. There is no evidence bear-
ing upon the possible effect of the requirements of new §9 (f-h) concerning filing
of union reports, constitutions and non-Communist affidavits, for while the work-
load of the Board was reduced during 1947 there is no causal connection estab-
lished between this decrease and the ability or desire of the Board to handle
more cases.
151 Watson's Specialty Store, 80 N.L.R.B. 533, 555, (1948), emphasis in origi-
nal. In this case Watson's operated in seven states and did a concededly interstate
business, being substantial enough to have the Board exercise its jurisdiction
if the business alone were involved. A home owner, Stanley, contracted with
Watson's to remodel his residence and the union now induced a strike of Watson's
employees who worked on Stanley's home. Said the Board, at p. 535, "While
it may be conceded that the complainant Watson's work on the Stanley residence
constituted a relatively small portion of Watson's business whose impact on
interstate commerce could in isolation, be regarded as de minimis [the legal
concept discussed in sbd. 1, supra], the effect of the Respondent's unfair labor
practice on interstate commerce "is not to be determined by confining judgment
to the quantitative effect of the activities immediately before the Board. Appropriate
for judgment is the fact that the immediate situation is representative of many others
....the total incidence of which, if left unchecked, may well become far reach-
ing in its harm to commerce,'" citing the Polish National Alliance case, supra
note 21, at p. 648.
152 The Watson case, supra note 151, at p. 540, where Chairman Herzog
concurred "because explicit statements in the 1947 legislative history reveal an
affirmative intention by Congress to invoke its full Constitutional power to pre-
vent secondary boycotts, even where their immediate impact is only on local
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were thus developed somewhat independently of the General Counsel's
views although, from his appointment in August of 1947 on, the Counsel
insisted upon the exercise of power "to the full extent," the disagreement
being aired before the Ball "Watch-dog" Committee the following
year."' The Board, as we know, emerged the victor in this conflict, for
not alone could it refuse to decide an unfair labor practice case even
where the General Counsel had issued a complaint, 154 but in September
of 1950 the latter resigned and the disagreement vanished.
But what was the effect of the Board's assertion of jurisdiction
over an industry, as with the building-construction industry, because of
congressional intent? Did this compel the exercise of power over every
employer in that industry or was there discretion even in that area?
During the spring of 1948 a house committee "sharply criticized the
[Board's] policy of extending the jurisdiction of the Act over small
business," and, by the fall of that year, "dissatisfaction was aroused
both in small-business circles and in Congress."' 5 In March, 1949, the
Board dismissed a complaint issued under sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2)
because "The question before us is one of discretion, not of power ...
Nor does Mentzer's status as a building contractor dictate a different
conclusion."' 56 The dissenting Member felt that "once the Board has
elected to assume jurisdiction over a given industry, it has chosen a path
which generally should be followed," whereas the concurring Chairman
felt that while this case was like the Wl/atson's Specalty case, where
jurisdiction had been exercised, still "a different result is permissible and
warranted here because the section of the Act involved has a different
legislative history. Here we have discretion to decline to assert juris-
enterprises. If, however, I thought the exercise of Board discretion, permissible,
I would, consistently with the view expressed in recent representation cases, refrain
from applying the Federal power to so local and so diminutive a controversy."
Houston dissented because "the effect on commerce here is so remote and so
insubstantial and the controversy involved is so local in character as to make
undesirable any exercise of the Federal power. I see no compulsive consideration
in the legislative history of the amended statute which would dictate the contrary
merely because the operation involved concerns the building and construction
industry."
163 This was appointed under Title IV of the Taft-Hartley Act, but
since fallen into limbo. For citations to the legislative hearings referred to herein,
see Millis & Brown, suPra note 143, at pp. 401, fn. 16, and 402, fn. 19.
154 E.g., A-1 Photo Service, 83 N.L.R.B. 564 (1949); Haleston Drug Stores,
Inc. 86 N.LR.B. 1166 (1949), upheld in Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. N.LR.B., 187
F. 2d 418 (9th Cir., 1951), cert. den. 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
U15Note 153, supra, giving references.
i Walter J. Mentzer, 82 N.L.R.B. 389, 391 (1949), Gray not participating,
with Herzog concurring and Reynolds dissenting. Herzog, however, concurred
in this exercise of discretion, although for reasons given below, so that a
majority of the Board did agree on this approach.
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diction; there we unfortunately had none," for Congress had disclosed
an intent that the Board "exercise the full constitutional power of the
Federal Government to prevent secondary boycotts [under section
8 (b) (4)]. Therefore, despite unwillingness to intervene in 'so local and
so diminutive a controversy,' I agreed that the Board had no choice
but to proceed" in that case whereas "Here, however, there is no such
compulsion present. These alleged unfair labor practices are of a different
character."' 57 The exercise of the Board's powers may thus be classi-
fied within three areas: representation and decertification petitions-the
Board has and exercises discretionary powers; unfair labor practice com-
plaints under all subdivisions of section 8(a) and (b) except section
8(b) (4) (A-D)---ditto; unfair labor practice complaints under section
8(b) (4) (A-D)-mandatory exercise of power.1 8
The legal de minimis doctrine, discussed in subdivision 1, may
now be contrasted with and differentiated from the Labor Board's dis-
cretionary de minimis doctrine, for whereas the former ousts Congress
and thereby the Board from any jurisdiction over the particular sub-
ject, the later acknowledges legal and delegated jurisdiction but does
not exercise its powers thereunder. This is not to say that every Board
rejection is -based upon a financial de minimis concept but, rather,
that the term gives one reason which may be utilized to answer the
question why the Board does not choose to exercise its conceded powers.'n
1571bid., at pp. 393 and 392, respectively. Herzog continued: "My reply to
Mr. Reynold's dissent simply is that Congress provided us with no parallel legis-
lative history with respect to these practices. It follows that the Board is as free
here as it was under the Wagner Act, and as all agree it has been in representation
cases since the amendments, to exercise discretion to take or to decline to take
jurisdiction."
158 See, e.g., the A-1 Photo case, supra note 154, at p. 565: "Under Section
10 of the Act, as amended the Board is 'empowered' to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice, 'affecting commerce,' but it is not directed
to exercise its preventive powers in all such cases." See like agreements by Courts
of Appeal in the Haleston Drug case, supra note 154, and Progressive Mine
Workers, AFL v. N.L.R.B. 189 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir., 1951); see -also N.L.R.B. v.
Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. 318 U.S. 9, 18 (1943) ; N.LR.B. v. Red Rock Co. 187
F. 2d 76 (5th Cir., 1951), cert. den. 341 U. S. 950.
See also Breeding Transfer Co. 110 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1954), fit. 3, quoting
from Herzog's 1949 testimony before a Senate committee: "It has been the position
of the Board that the Federal Government should not use its constitutional power
right up to the hilt. In other words where something has a local flavor to it,...
we should [not] waste" federal effort and funds on it. "Thai was the practice
under the Wagner Act and there was nothing in our opinion in the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act to require change with the possible exception of
some variation in secondary boycotts and possible jurisdictional disputes as well."
159 E.g., United Tel. Co. of the West, 112 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1955): "Regard-
ing the question of which party correctly interpreted the contract, the Board
does not ordinarily exercise its jurisdiction to settle such conflicts. As the Board
has held for many years, with the approval of the courts: ' . . . it will not effectuate
the statutory policy . . . for the Board to assume the role of policing collective
contracts between employers and labor organizations by attempting to decide
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There are thus numerous reasons, constitutional, statutory, and discre-
tionary, why jurisdiction is not exercised over particular matters, and it
is the last of these three general reasons which is of present concern.
How is it possible for employers, employees, and (union) representatives
to know when and also under what circumstances they are subject to
federal or state regulatoin by boards or courts? Whose policies apply,
and whose law is to be enforced? If a case-by-case approach is to be
utilized in this discretionary area then confusion worse confounded results.
The business and labor outcry against the application and results of such a
Board discretion reached a point where the Board, in late 1950, felt
that the "time has come, we believe, when experience warrants the
establishment and announcement of certain standards which will better
clarify and define where the difficult line [of discretion] can best be
drawn."'"6 A series of decisions thereupon became the peg upon which
to hang a listing of nine general standards for the advance determina-
tion of the Board's exercise of its jurisdiction and, after a period of ap-
proximately four years' experience under these standards, a reassessment
occurred and various modifications were spelled out.161 "In making these
modifications," said the majority, "we have given due consideration to all
of the criteria spelled out by the Board in 1950, including (1) the prob-
lem of bringing the case load of the Board down to manageable size,
(2) the desirability of reducing an extraordinarily large case load in
order that we may give adequate attention to more important cases, (3)
the relative importance to the national economy of essentially local
enterprises as against those having a truly substantial impact on our
economy, and (4) over-all budgetary policies and limitations. If one of
the inevitable consequences of our action is to leave a somewhat larger
area for local regulation of disputes, we do not share our colleagues'
apparent view that this is a ,sinister development. We do say, however,
that a desire to establish broader State jurisdiction is in no wise a factor
in our decision. We are concerned here solely with the problem of
defining the limits of our jurisdiction pursuant to the discretionary power
vested in us by the Congress."
whether disputes as to the meaning and administration of such contracts constitute
unfair labor practices under the Act'." Citing Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47
N.L.R.B. 694 (1943), enfd. 141 F. 2d 785 (9th Cir., 1944); Crown Zellerbach Corp.
95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951).
16OHollow Tree Lumber Co., N.L.R.B. 635, 636 (1950). See also 16th
Annual Report (1952) p. 15: "For many years, the question of where to draw the
line necessarily turned upon the facts of each case as it came before the Board
for decision. But early in the 1951 fiscal year, after long study of the pattern
emerging from past decision, the Board issued a series of unanimous decisions
setting forth more precisely the standards to govern its future exercise of juris-
diction in the 48 States."
161 On July 1st (Release #445) and 8th (#449) the Board announced its new
rules, but in between, on July 8th (#448), the General Counsel dismissed two
investigations into unfair labor practice charges, the reason being that the new
standards did not permit complaints to issue. However, it was not until October
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It is unnecessary to list or develop in extenso these amended stand-
ards except to note that they resulted in a narrowing of the area in which
the Board's powers would be exercised and, in the words of a newspaper
headline, "thousands of businesses are freed of jurisdiction in labor rela-
tions."' 62 The new standards for example, increased the dollar minimums
of sales and purchases which had to be met before the concern would
come under the Board's discretionary jurisdiction, applied dollar minimums
now to public utilities and transit systems, as well as to concerns engaged
in businesses related to the national defense, rejected jurisdiction based
solely upon operation under a franchise from a national enterprise, freed
general or public office buildings from Board jurisdiction grounded
merely on the fact that the buildings had tenants over which jurisdiction
was taken, and refused to exercise jurisdiction over public restaurants.1 63
What was the effect of this 1950 and 1954 enunciation of stand-
ards? For instance, did a state now have jurisdiction and power over an
28, 1954, that the Board itself was able to apply the new standards to a series of
eight cases. Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1954), is the most im-
portant, for here Murdock dissented vigorously and, in the words of the majority
of three, took the position "that the Board was required by law to exercise the
fullest reach of its jurisdictional powers," while Peterson agreed with the majority
in that "the Board is not legally precluded from adopting new jurisdictional
standards," he nevertheless felt the new plan to be of an "arbitrary and categorical
character."
162 N. Y. Times, July 15, 1955. As expressive of congressional desire that
discretion be so exercised, see the colloquy between Congressmen Kersten and
Hartley on June 4, 1947, on the floor of the House, 93 Cong. Rec. 6540: "We are
very anxious that disputes be settled at the State level insofar as is possible. Can
the gentleman give us assurance on that proposition, so that it is a matter of rec-
ord, that that is the sense of the language of the report?" To which Hartley
responded that that was the sense of the bill and the report, whereupon Kersten
asked: "And it will permit as many' of these disputes to be settled at the State
level as possible?" "Exactly," replied Hartley.
163 There have been interpretations and qualifications of these criteria in
cases decided subsequent to October 28, 1954, e.g., Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd.,
112 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (1955) (Murdock dissenting), holding that local, charter,
pleasure tour, sight-seeing motor tour operations are not "public transit company"
matters within The Greenwich Gas Co., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 9.1 (1954), and Rollo
Transit Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 228 (1954), cases. See also The Scranton Times,
Ill N.L.R.B. No. 128 (1955). One of the most important Board decisions, however,
is Cantera Providencia, 111 N.L.R.B. No. 141 (1955), the opinion stating that
"in the present case and in future cases the Board's entire jurisdictional standards
will be uniformly applied in the Territories as in the several States." See also
South P.R. Broadcasting Corp., 111 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (1955). It obviously requires
separate treatment to develop adequately not alone these aspects of the Board's
jurisdictional standards, but numerous others as well;' problems of space preclude
this analysis, and so we confine our discussion to the matters here set forth,
although as to secondary boycotts and the criteria governing when the primary
employer's business does not bring him within the dollar standards, see Jamestown
Builders Exchange, Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. 86 (1951), and Sand Door & Plywood Co.,
113 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (1955).
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industry or concern just because the Federal Board could not or did not
exercise jurisdiction or power? This is too broad a statement, as the
discussion in subdivisions 1 and 2 above have shown, so that we inquire
whether, in the area of concurrent jurisdiction, and when and where
the Labor Board's self-effacing policy is applied, the states may auto-
matically act so long as the Board does not indicate a negative desire.
We have, in subdivision 2, utilized the Bethlehem Steel case to
illustrate how the positive jurisdiction of the Labor Board, regardless of
its vacillating exercise, prevents state action, and we now refer to it for
one of the last comments in the majority opinion, "The election of the
National Board to decline jurisdiction in certain types of cases, for
budgetary, or other reasons presents a different problem which we do
not now decide." '64 That decision has never been squarely presented
and made.65 but, from every indication, congressional, judicial, and
Board, which has been presented to now, the conclusion is reached that
Board withdrawal from an area of concurrent jurisdiction permits state
entry and control.' 66 This general statement is nevertheless subject to
exceptions and limitations other than those already discussed; for example,
does Board certification automatically oust state boards from asserting
any jurisdiction whatsoever? Insofar as certifications are concerned, a
Board affirmative certification or a refusal to certify but acceptance
of jurisdiction, ousts state boards from entering this area, since the
Bethlehem Steel case has not been reversed judicially or congressionally;
however, insofar as unfair labor practice complaints are concerned,
while states may not enter the field taken up in section 8, still they are
free to enforce "their own policies in matters not governed by the
federal law," as "The character of activities left to State regulation is not
164 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. N.Y.S.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 767 (1947). In a
separate opinion, joined in by Murphy and Rutledge, Frankfurter contended that
if such suggestion permitted states to exercise jurisdiction when the Board felt
it could not afford to, then a deliberate cession (as was there involved) should
prove a greater prop to state action. At p. 778. One of the reasons for the Board's
"desire to share burdens that may be the State's concern no less than the Nation's,"
concluded the Justice, is the (then) increasing backlog of cases. At p. 783.
165 As late as 1954, in Bldg. Trades Council v. Kinard Constr. Co., 346
U.S. 933 (1954), it was said that "the Court does not [here] pass upon the
question suggested by the opinion below of whether the state court could grant
its own relief should the board decline to exercise its jurisdiction." Thus the
Supreme Court's numerous statements that "the Board sometimes properly declines
to [take jurisdiction] . . . , stating that the policies of the Act would not be
effectuated," N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684
(1951), do not supply the answer to whether the states may now move in.
166 The judicial concepts explored in subds. g and h are to be meaningfully
applied to this analysis, although disagreement with the conclusions may be found,
e.g., Universal Car & Service Co. v. International Association of Machinists, etc.,
27 Lab Cas. par. 68, 825 (Mich. Circ. Ct., 1954). However, for a contrary opinion,
and with which this writer concurs, see Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, etc. Local No.
941 v. Whitfield Transportation, Inc., 27 Lab. Cas. par. 68,863 (Tex. Sup. St., 1954).
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changed by the fact of certification."' 7 But if no federal jurisdiction has
been sought, either in a representation or a complaint proceeding, then
conclusion 6 of subdivision 2 applies, that the possibility and not the
probability of Board acceptance of jurisdiction is sufficient to oust the state
of jurisdiction' 6 s unless there is a "clear showing . . . that it would be
futile to do so . .. 169 If such a clear showing is made, or the federal
Board has actually declined to exercise its discretionary powers because
of the reasons examined, then local action is permissible. To what extent
may such local powers be exercised? At present it would appear that
lower state courts feel no federal impedimenta are raised to complete state
action.. but, it is suggested, this is incorrect; national policy, or Board
interpretation thereof, still control, so that except for specific con-
gressional acquiescence in local supremacy, e.g., section 14(b), states
cannot, in the exercise of powers voluntarily abnegated by the Board,
create a conflict in policy. This, it is submitted, is not alone logical but
1 67 The Algoma Plywood case, supra note 94, at pp. 315, 316. "So far as the
relationship of State and national power is concerned, certification amounts to
no more than an assertion that as to this employer the state shall not impose
a policy inconsistent with national policy . . . or the National Board's interpre-
tation of that policy . ..
168E.g., N.Y.S. Labor Relations Board v. Wags Transportation System,
Inc., 284 App. Div. 883, 134 N.Y.S. 2d 603, 604 (1954): "It is not sufficiently clear
that the National Labor Relations Board ... would have declined jurisdiction in
the state of facts disclosed in this case . . . . There being no clear showing that
the National Board would not have assumed jurisdiction . . . the appellant [state
board] could not assert jurisdiction."
169The Kinard Construction case, supra note 165. See also La Crosse Tele-
phone Corp. v. W.E.R.B., 336 U.S. 18, 25 (1949), where state board jurisdiction
to certify was denied because "the industry is one over which the National Board
has consistently exercised jurisdiction." Because of the "potentials of conflict," even
though the federal Board had not yet applied itself "in any formal way to this
particular employer," there could be no state action save through cession under
§10(a). At p. 26. It is submitted that the exceedingly strict reasoning in these
sentences is not acceptable today for, under its dollar criteria, the federal Board
may assert jurisdiction over half of an industry, and reject it over the other
half (or any other proportions desired); but if even one concern in an industry
is thus embraced on a discretionary basis, all others are cast into a no-man's
land, for now the Labor Board won't, and the states can't. The policy of the
courts and the Congress has either changed or become more sophisticated.
170 E.g., Satin, Inc. v. Local Union 445, IBEW 26 Lab. Cas. par. 68, 508
(Mich. 1954), upholding an injunction against picketing where the court felt the
federal Board had declined, and would continue to decline, jurisdiction;
Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen, etc. Union No. 695, AFL, CCH Lab. Law.
Repts., par. 49, 280 (Wise. 1954), where the Wisconsin board ordered an election
when it found the federal Board would decline to act. See also 6 LAB. L. J. 6024
(1955) where the views of the New York and Wisconsin Boards are given,
and the Michigan Board is quoted, all feeling that they had jurisdiction over
inter-state employers who did not meet the federal Board's jurisdictional stand-
ards regardless of that Board's inaction. See also note 174, infra. Despite these
views, this writer's opinion, keyed to note 171, is adhered to.
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also more in consonance with the national interest and the national will,
i.e., congressional desires.
1 7 1
For example, congressional policy is disclosed in the proviso to sec-
tion 10(a) whereby Board cession in unfair labor practice cases is per-
mitted when state policy therein conforms to the federal. However, this
ability to cede is limited by the parenthetical withdrawal of such power
over "mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except
where predominantly local in character." The federal Board can therefore
cede matters in the area of transportation only when they are predomi-
nantly local, but exactly what does this clause mean? To illustrate, a three-
truck, ten-employee trucker does -business of an exclusively interstate
character, but operates from his home, purchases all equipment locally,
etc.; his gross annual income is $45,000, whereas under the new standards
the Board will exercise jurisdiction over intrastate trucking firms which
are links in interstate commerce only if they do at least $100,000 business
annually for concerns in certain other categories over which jurisdiction
is to be exercised; the Board refuses, whether or not correctly and prop-
erly, to bother with our hypothetical trucker; can the state take over?
The answer should be no, for the trucker is not doing an intrastate
trucking business (his purchases of equipment, etc. do not make him
an intrastate concern), the express prohibition against cession is an in-
dication of congressional intent that states not enter the field even if the
Board refuses to exercise its powers, and a national policy must be federally
set for such interstate concerns. Or, as another example, Congress has
said, in section 9 (f-h), that unions cannot apply to or use the processes of
the federal Board unless they file certain information and their officers
file non-Communist affidavits. The Board's discretionary policy excludes
a concern, and a non-complying union seeks local aid, no such filing
requirements being found in the state act. There might possibly be no
171 Strong arguments can be levelled against this conclusion, e.g., it may be
said that under this interpretation the state boards would become merely local
sub-agencies of the National Board without being compensated; that states having
their own statutes would be forced willy-nilly, to either conform entirely or else
have two sets of rules, one for interstate and the other for intrastate businesses:
that such a confusing and unfair pattern would cause either rejection of the
former or else force the states to close up shop; in either of these last two situations
there would be a no-man's land in federal labor relations. Also, Congress attempted
to compel states to conform, via §10(a)'s cession proviso, but the failure of this
bait has now convinced Congress, the Board and the courts that a discretionary
cession must carry with it a corresponding freedom to determine local policy. (This
last may be a boomerang, however, for the proponent of national policy and
uniformity even in state action may argue that a clear indication has been there-
by given by Congress that states must conform when they act; this is doubly
bolstered by reference to §14[b] which discloses a specific congressional exception
to the general rule of §10[a], and also to the fact that Congress knew and spoke
of the Bethlehem Steel case in framing the latter section.)
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cession under section 10(a)17 but this is immaterial; congressional
policy is disclosed and the question is whether the Board can frustrate
this policy by its discretionary exercise of its power. To this writer the
intent of Congress in this field is uncertain, but it is suggested that the
filing requirements not be impediments in this area of discretionary juris-
diction -by States for then a true no-man's land of chaos and uncertainty
would become a fact. Furthermore, the statutory cession's proviso is a
general one applying to a requirement applicable to unfair labor practices,
whereas the Board's discretionary policy permits discretionary cession
in representation cases; this argument, of course, is not too secure a
foundation upon which to build the conclusion suggested, but even one
slight indication takes on additional strength when cumulated with others.
However it may be rationalized, congressional intent and policy are here
different, so that different approaches are possible federally and locally.
But even if these views are incorrect the Board still retains power,
whenever it sees fit, to-assume jurisdiction, set national policy, and thereby
denounce all such local assumption of jurisdiction and conflicting inter-
pretations. But a still more intriguing problem emerges-an interstate
business does not come under the Board's discretionary powers because of
a low dollar volume; the state board Assumes jurisdiction and now, under
state law, a closed shop contract is permitted, or supervisors or guards may
join the bargaining unit, etc.; can the federal Board overthrow such a
valid contract, or is it deprived of jurisdiction during the term of the state
certification or bargaining agreement or both? The answer must be in
favor of national jurisdiction, so that local boards, unions, and employers
must dance to the tune played by the Board." 3 Of the numerous possible
curious results which may flow only one need here be mentioned: the
Board rejects jurisdiction and the state board certifies a union; the em-
ployer refuses to bargain and the state board finds him guilty of an
172 This may be questioned as the language of the proviso speaks of inability
to cede where "the provision . . . applicable to determination of such ["unfair
labor practices (listed in section 8)"] cases . . . is inconsistent with the cor-
responding provision of this Act" etc. This limitation upon cession therefore
requires parallelism in §8's listings of unfair labor practices and apparently does
not concern itself with the other provisions of the Act.
173 There appears to be one exception to this, found in N.L.R.B. v. Guy S.
Atkinson Co., 195 F. 2d 141 (9th Cir., 1952). There the Board had refused juris-
diction over construction projects during which period the contractor executed
a closed shop contract and now fired his employee for the latter's failure to
remain a union member; the Board now asserted jurisdiction, held an unfair
labor practice had been committed, and ordered reinstatement, etc. The Ninth
Circuit refused to enforce because such retroactive application of policy con-
flicted with §3(a) (3) of the Administrative Procedure Act, made applicable
by §6 of the Labor Act, the former statute requiring publication in the Federal
Register of "statements of general policy or interpretations." The conclusion may
be fair although the reasoning is questionable, for the court here is confusing
rules and regulations, and statements of policy, with press releases, and with
judicial-type decisions.
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unfair labor practice, obtains a state enforcement order, and the State's
highest court affirms; we may even venture that the Supreme Court
refuses certification or else affirms, agreeing that federal rejection em-
powers such state action; the employer is now under a mandate of the
state and federal highest courts to bargain, whereupon he (or his em-
ployees) now applies to the federal Board for a representation election
or for an unfair labor practice holding; the federal Board reverses itself
and assumes jurisdiction; thus, with the stroke of their pen, three federal
appointees set at naught the months and years of state (and even federal
Supreme Court) efforts! Fantastic, yes, but possible, yes, and this, of course,
results in unsettling, rather than settling, the course of labor relations
in and which affects interstate commerce;174 any other conclusion, how-
ever, would permit a delegatee to bind its delegator when the latter had
refused to be so tied and had never delegated such power, i.e., the Board
would be able to act ultra vires and render itself impotent to act when
Congress had commanded it have the ability to act, even though it need
not.17
5
174 See also the La Crosse Tel. case, supra note 169, at p. 26, where a stronger
conclusion is reached: "The uncertainty as to which board is master and how long
it will remain such can be as disruptive of peace between various industrial factions
as actual competition between two boards for supremacy." Despite the tenor
of our discussion concerning the disruption of industrial peace, laid at the door
of the federal Board, what of legislation such as that just passed by New York,
L. 1955, chap. 764, eff. April 28, 1955, providing that the state's Labor Relations
Act is not to apply to the employees of any employer who concedes to and agrees
with the Board that such employees are subjejct to and protected by the provisions
of the federal Act or the federal Railway Labor Act. Assume Jones does so con-
cede and agree to federal coverage, does this mean that the federal Board must
accept jurisdiction? The obvious answer is no, and we are once again back to the
Counsel-Board feud previously discussed, with its jurisdictional consequences.
Nevertheless, the problems of federal-state jurisdiction are so onerous that the
states, as well as the federal government, seek for a way out of the morass of
vacillating decisions and policy.
175This confusion is not found only in this aspect of the Taft-Hartley Act,
for the Sixth Circuit has upheld a Board finding that no 8(b) (4) violation oc-
curred while simultaneously upholding a jury's verdict and finding that such
a violation had occurred. See United Brick & Clay Workers of America v. Deena
Artware Inc. 198 F. 2d 637 (6th Cir., 1952); N.L.R.B. v. Deena Artware, Inc.,
198 F. 2d 645 (6th Cir., 1952). The reasoning of the court, however, is unquestion-
ably correct and is a convincing illustration of proper judicial review. Another
source of confusion may be found in §302, for subd. d makes it a misdemeanor to
violate any of the provisions of the section, among which are prohibitions upon
employer giving and union representative accepting of bribes; suppose the Board
rejects jurisdiction over a union because the employer does not come within one
of its standards, does this oust the federal attorney from prosecuting? If so, the
Board can immunize conduct which Congress has made criminal, and this con-
sequence was never intended; thus a Labor Board "no" does not necessarily mean a
federal attorney "no."
